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3ABSTRACT
Academic psychology has traditionally considered subjective explanations for
judgments and decisions unreliable or even fabricated. Additionally,
explanations have been shown to interfere with judgment and decision making
processes, which can degrade the quality of choices. These phenomena have
been attributed to processes that cannot be verbalized, either because of the
lack of vocabulary or conscious access to these processes. This is assumed to
shift the processing from the non-verbal or non-conscious mode into a more
verbal and conscious mode, leading to either fabrication or interference. The
problem affects particularly the judgments and decisions that are based on
subjective experience.
This dissertation examines these effects in the context of high image quality
by assuming that subjective experience is a highly relevant intermediate
processing stage in perceptual decision making, whereas subjective
explanations reflect the contents of socially oriented conscious thought, which
originates from the metacognitive understanding related to the judgment and
decision-making processes. When these different forms of conscious mental
content are dissociated due to social pressure or lack of conceptual knowledge
about the perceptual features, interference or fabrication can occur.
This dissertation presents the ideas underlying the Interpretation-Based
Quality  (IBQ)  method,  which  emphasizes  the  special  nature  of  subjective
experience (or phenomenal consciousness) in judgments and decisions: Every
individual has his or her own subjective point of view, from which the world is
interpreted. These interpretations underlie personal and subjective
experience. In the context of preferential judgment and decision making, the
differences between individuals, arising from different ways of experiencing
the world, are easily regarded as measurement error. The IBQ method
approaches these differences by asking research participants to explain their
decisions in their own words. These explanations have been further analyzed
qualitatively in order to find the relevant subjective dimensions on which
decisions are based.
As subjective explanations are used as data, the use of the IBQ method must
respond to claims concerning unreliability, fabrication and interference.
Therefore, four studies were conducted to test these claims in the evaluation
of high image quality. As explaining has been found to shift processing into a
more  conscious  mode,  these  studies  can  also  inform  about  the  role  of
conscious thought in perceptual judgments and decisions.
The general finding of this research was that conscious thought, evoked by
the requirement to explain judgments, can also enhance the decision maker’s
performance in cases that require tradeoffs, effortful information search and
consistency over several decisions. This is typical for the context of high image
quality evaluation, where the differences between stimuli are small and
4multidimensional. The results suggest that, generally, when conscious thought
and subjective experience work in concert, subjective explanations can provide
highly useful qualitative data about the dimensions of subjective experience
that are relevant in judgments and decisions. These dimensions are dependent
on personal and contextual factors and cannot be predicted from physical data
alone.
The results support the recent findings and theoretical contributions about
the relations between decision making and consciousness. They emphasize the
role  of  phenomenal  consciousness  as  a  multi-dimensional  space  where
information about voluntary actions is presented. The information integration
processes, however, are usually automatic and non-conscious. The importance
of conscious thought in decision making appears to be its ability to bring
relevant information into consciousness by means of voluntary attention. This
happens particularly in conflicts and when the decisions are novel. In these
situations conscious thought and an analytic approach is activated
automatically. This mechanism derives from metacognitive understanding,
which is learned gradually in similar judgment and decision-making
situations.
5TIIVISTELMÄ
Akateemisen psykologian piirissä on perinteisesti suhtauduttu skeptisesti
selityksille, joita ihmiset antavat päätöksilleen: Niitä on pidetty – ei pelkästään
epäluotettavina – vaan suorastaan tekaistuina. Lisäksi päätösten selittämisen
on todettu vaikuttavan itse päätöksentekoprosessiin, toisinaan häiritsevästi.
Näiden ilmiöiden on oletettu johtuvan siitä, että päätöksentekoprosesseja on
vaikea sanallistaa, joko käsitteellisen tiedon puutteen vuoksi, tai koska
yksilöllä ei ole pääsyä prosesseihin, jotka ovat tiedostamattomia. Alkuperäisen
prosessin sanallistamisen vaikeus saattaa muuttaa prosesseja helpommin
sanallistettavaan muotoon, jolloin yhteys alkuperäiseen
päätöksentekoprosessiin tai jopa aitoihin mieltymyksiin katoaa. Tästä
seurauksena voi olla tekaistu selitys, joka ei kerro alkuperäisestä prosessista,
tai jollain tavalla muuttunut päätös prosessin muutoksen tuloksena.
Näiden ilmiöiden on oletettu koskevan erityisesti päätöksiä, joita tehdään
subjektiivisen kokemuksen perusteella. Subjektiivinen kokemus viittaa
fenomenaaliseen tietoisuuteen, eli siihen miten koetaan kipu, punaisen
näkeminen tai vaikkapa viha, erotuksena tietoisesta ajattelusta, jossa näitä
kokemuksia voidaan reflektoida ja esimerkiksi liittää aikaisempiin
kokemuksiin. Tämä väitöskirja tarkastelee kyseisiä ilmiöitä kuvanlaadun
arvioinnin kontekstissa, olettaen että subjektiivisen kokemus on olennainen
välivaihe matalan tason havaintoprosessien ja varsinaisen päätöksen välillä.
Selitykset päätöksille taas heijastelevat tietoista ajattelua, jonka ajatellaan
olevan sosiaalista todellisuutta heijasteleva korkeamman asteen tietoisuuden
muoto. Tietoinen ajattelu siis pohjaa päätöstilanteiden metakognitiiviseen
ymmärtämiseen.  Jos tietoisen ajattelun yhteys subjektiiviseen kokemukseen
ei toimi kunnolla, esimerkiksi sosiaalisen paineen vuoksi, selittämisen
aiheuttama prosessin muutos voi häiritä päätöksiä tai johtaa tekaistuihin
selityksiin.
Väitöskirjassa esitellään tulkintaan perustuva laatu -lähestymistapa
(Interpretation-Based Quality, lyh. IBQ), joka korostaa subjektiivisen
kokemuksen (eli fenomenaalisen tietoisuuden) erityistä luonnetta
päätöksenteossa: subjektiivinen kokemus syntyy aina yksilöllisestä
näkökulmasta, jonka kautta maailmaa tulkitaan. Jos nämä tulkinnat eivät ole
tutkijan tiedossa, yksilöiden väliset erot tulkitaan helposti mittausvirheeksi.
IBQ lähestyy näitä eroja pyytämällä koehenkilöitä kuvaamaan perusteluja
tekemilleen päätöksille omin sanoin. Perustelut analysoidaan laadullisesti,
jotta pystytään kuvaamaan koehenkilöiden päätöksenteon kannalta
olennaiset ulottuvuudet (eli päätöksentekoavaruus).
Koska tutkimusaineistona käytetään subjektiivisia selityksiä päätöksille,
on IBQ-menetelmän vastattava kyseisiin tutkimusmenetelmiin liittyvään
kritiikkiin, koskien perustelujen luotettavuutta ja niiden vaikutusta
alkuperäiseen päätöksentekoprosessiin. Tämän vuoksi suoritettiin neljä
6tutkimusta, joissa tarkasteltiin ko. väitteisiin liittyviä tutkimuskysymyksiä.
Tutkimusten konteksti oli kuvanlaadun arviointi. Koska päätösten
selittämisen on todettu muuttavan ajatteluprosessia tietoisemmaksi,
tutkimusten avulla on mahdollista myös ymmärtää tietoisen ajattelun
merkitystä aistinvaraisissa päätöksissä.
Tutkimusten perusteella voidaan sanoa, että päätösten perusteleminen ja
siihen liittyvä tietoinen ajattelu voi myös parantaa päätöksentekijän
suoriutumista, kun päätös vaatii kompromisseja vaihtoehtojen eri
ominaisuuksien välillä, tahdonalaista tiedonhakua tai yhdenmukaisuutta eri
päätösten välillä. Nämä kaikki ovat tyypillisiä korkean tason kuvanlaadulle,
jossa erot ärsykkeiden välillä ovat pieniä ja moniulotteisia. Tulokset osoittavat,
että kun tietoinen ajattelu ja subjektiivinen kokemus ovat sopusoinnussa,
subjektiiviset perustelut päätöksille voivat tuottaa hyödyllistä tietoa
olennaisista päätöksentekoulottuvuuksista. Nämä ulottuvuudet ovat
riippuvaisia yksilö- ja kontekstitekijöistä eikä niitä ole mahdollista ennustaa
fysikaalisesta informaatiosta.
Tulokset tukevat viimeaikaisia tutkimustuloksia ja teorioita tietoisuuden ja
päätöksenteon suhteesta. Nämä korostavat fenomenaalisen tietoisuuden
merkitystä paikkana, jossa päätöksenteon kannalta olennainen tieto esitetään.
Tiedon integrointi päätökseksi kuitenkin tapahtuu useimmiten tiedostamatta
automaattisesti. Tietoisen ajattelun merkitys päätöksenteossa näyttäisi siis
olevan tahdonalaisen tarkkaavaisuuden avulla tuoda päätöksen kannalta
olennainen informaatio tietoisuuteen. Näin todennäköisesti tapahtuu
erityisesti konflikteissa ja kun päätös on yksilölle uusi. Näissä tilanteissa
tietoinen ajattelu ja analyyttinen lähestymistapa useimmiten aktivoituvat
automaattisesti.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Giving reasons for our decisions would appear to be a completely normal
everyday skill. When someone is unable to do it, it is usually considered a sign
of irrationality (Kozuch & Nichols, 2011). As we are often required to make
choices that involve others, both as individuals or in groups, the ability to make
one’s actions understandable and accepted bears an important social function
(Baumeister, Clark, Kim, & Lau, 2017; Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010;
Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Relevant arguments can be taken as a sign that one
has considered all the relevant aspects of a decision and that the decision
maker  is  trustworthy  and  able  to  take  responsibility  for  those  decisions;
therefore  requiring  explanations  for  decisions  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of
accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Keeping these aspects in mind, it easy
to understand why folk psychology places so much weight on thorough
deliberation and regards rational reasoning processes as transparent to
introspection (Kozuch & Nichols, 2011).
How  well  can  we  understand  the  decisions  of  individuals  just  by  asking
them to offer their subjective explanations? Although this is something that
we often do, and our everyday experience suggests that it is a valid practice,
attitudes in academic psychology have been skeptical about the scientific value
of this kind of data from the early 1900s, when behaviorism aimed to get rid
of all data that it considered subjective (D. A. Lieberman, 1979; Watson, 1913).
Even after the behaviorist era, experimental research remained focused on
subjective phenomena as responses to stimuli, not on how subjective mental
contents mediate behavior, practically following the behaviorist tradition (D.
A. Lieberman, 1979).
The emerging cognitive science declared (conscious) thoughts to be objects
of investigation in the seventies, and the experimenters probed research
participants’ thoughts by asking them to think aloud (e.g. Payne, 1976; Simon
& Newell, 1972). This, however, did not change the attitudes of psychologists
in general, at least in matters of judgment and decision making (Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977). The proponents of think-aloud methods wanted to make a clear
distinction between thinking aloud, which was considered to be a somewhat
objective description of the thought process, and subjective explanations,
which were assumed to be invalid subjective interpretations about the mental
processes and prone to omissions (Ericsson & Simon, 1980).
Certain  empirical  findings  further  supported  the  skeptics:  Nisbett  and
Wilson (1977), for instance, showed that people are unable to report all factors
that affect their choices, and they appear to explain their choices by relying on
a culturally shared stockpile of plausible reasons. Furthermore, it was later
shown that individuals easily fabricate reasons for their actions: this was first
found among patients who had gone through a split-brain operation
(Gazzaniga, 1989), and then with normal healthy adults (Johansson, Hall,
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Sikström, & Olsson, 2005). This fabrication tends to occur involuntarily and
without awareness (Gazzaniga, 1989). In addition to fabrication, requiring
individuals to explain their judgments sometimes appears to have a distracting
effect (Wilson & Schooler, 1991), contrary to the view emphasizing justification
as a form of accountability.
The hypothesis that additional self-reflection has a detrimental effect on
judgments contradicts the usual view of reason and conscious thinking as the
source of rationality. Irrationality has traditionally been attributed to
emotions or Freudian subconscious impulses, for instance. All these findings,
suggesting that people are limited in their ability to reflect on their judgment
and decision making (JDM) processes, have attracted much attention, as can
be seen by looking at citation counts. The reason for this may be the fact that
the traditional view of humans as socially responsible agents requires them to
be aware of what they are doing (Doris, 2018; Frith, 2012).
This dissertation concerns the role of the explanations given to judgments
and decisions that are based on subjective experience. Skepticism that has
been associated with people’s ability to introspect the reasons for their
judgments has been most prominent in such tasks, as they require
transforming subjective and private, non-verbal experiences into words
(Ericsson  &  Simon,  1980;  Wilson,  Dunn,  Kraft,  &  Lisle,  1989;  Wilson  &
Schooler, 1991). Furthermore, these subjective experiences are often assumed
to  be  based  on  processes  that  are  not  within  the  reach  of  conscious  access
(Nisbett  &  Wilson,  1977),  increasing  the  probability  that  individuals  have  a
tendency to theorize the reasons for their actions.
Decisions based on subjective experience are not marginal; on the contrary:
many prominent authors suggest that most decisions we make are in fact
based  on  intuitive  impressions  (Kahneman,  2003),  emotions  (Bechara  &
Damasio, 2005), or percepts about the outside world or our bodily states
(Morsella, Godwin, Jantz, Krieger, & Gazzaley, 2016). Decisions that are based
on conscious thought, that is, deliberative manipulation of information in
working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), should then represent a tiny
minority of all decisions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Therefore, this research
problem concerns a wide variety of judgment and decision tasks that people
face in their daily lives and which they may be asked to explain.
Despite the results questioning the ability to introspect reasons for their
behaviors, people have not stopped asking for explanations for judgments and
decisions, even in academic environments. This dissertation therefore
approaches  subjective  explanations  both  as  a  scientific  method,  which  is
supposed to give insights into an individual’s basis of decisions, as well as
social  behavior,  which  justifies  these  decisions  to  others.  These  aspects  can
sometimes be in contradiction, as will later be discussed. The purpose of the
present approach is to take a new look at the explanations: instead of relying
on the conscious-reportable vs. non-conscious-non-reportable dichotomy, it
is  based  on  the  assumption  of  the  interaction  between  conscious  and  non-
conscious processes.
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From these premises, three central aspects arise: 1) subjective experience
is a relevant part of the interactive causal chain between the objective world
and  decisions;  2)  the  validity  and  the  reliability  of  the  data  based  on
explanations is dependent on the experimental design and the familiarity of
the task to the individual; and 3) the effect of explaining on the performance
in JDM tasks is variable and dependent on the task properties, instructions
and abilities of the individual. This dissertation investigates these problems in
the context of visual quality.
1.1 CONSCIOUSNESS
Understanding how the explanations for decisions are generated requires
some knowledge about two forms of conscious mental content, subjective
experience and conscious thought.1 Explanations reflect conscious thoughts
(Baumeister et. al 2010); the judgments and the choices that are in focus in
this research, however, are based on the information present in subjective
experience. Dissociation between these mental contents appears to be one of
the main reasons for the counter-intuitive results that have been found
concerning people’s ability to introspect reasons for their behaviors (Reber,
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011). Therefore the
next sections concentrate on describing their role and interactions in JDM.
1.1.1 SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
Subjective experience, or phenomenal consciousness, is usually regarded
as the more primitive, non-reflective form of consciousness. When discussing
its contents, or qualia, we refer to what it is like to be in a certain mental state
(Nagel, 1974), such as seeing red, or feeling anger or pain, etc. In other words,
in phenomenal consciousness we experience red, pain or emotions. These
represent private, first-person knowledge, and there is no way to measure
subjective experience objectively (Nagel, 1974): for instance, we may study a
bat’s brain extensively when it uses echolocation to find prey but this objective
knowledge does not reveal how the bat experiences its environment. In other
words, objective third-person knowledge never fully captures the first-person
point of view of subjective experience. When humans are concerned, the only
way to access this experiential knowledge is by asking an individual to report
it. Even then we are restricted by language (or any other communication
method) and how observers are able to describe their experiences and how the
listener is able to understand these descriptions. These problems relating to
1 The division between these two is not absolute, rather the purpose is to
use concepts concerning consciousness that have been relevant in empirical
literature.
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the reliance on first-person knowledge, rather than (neutral) third-person
knowledge, have since Watson (1913) been the main argument when scientific
inquiry towards subjective experience has been opposed.
Nevertheless, many scientists nowadays assume that subjective experience
plays a crucial role in the survival of humans and animals, such as mammals
and birds, with complex cognitions. According to the contemporary view,
information processing of the brain is distributed to a massive parallel set of
specialized processors, or modules (Baars, 2005; Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider,
2017; Fodor, 1983; Gazzaniga, 1989; Morsella et al., 2016; Zeki & Bartels,
1999). For example, information from the eye is directed to numerous neural
units that process different visual features, such as line orientations,
movement and color. This feature information is further utilized by processors
that guide body movements and analyze the identities of the objects in the
visual scene (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, Ungerleider, &
Mishkin, 2013; Prinz, 2000). A fundamental question is how is coherent action
possible when information processing is fragmented to different locations of
the brain and, in particular, when the results of these processors are in conflict
with each other in a complex human brain?
The solution to this problem would introduce an intermediate phase of
processing between sensation and action, where the information relevant to
current needs is selected so that coherent behavior becomes possible. A
converging  consensus  among  scientists  suggests  that  this  is  the  function  of
consciousness (Baars, 2005; Dennett, 2001; Morsella, 2005; Morsella et al.,
2016). In other words, phenomenal consciousness is, as Dehaene et al. (2006)
call it, a global neuronal workspace, where modules distribute the results of
their processes and from where this information is available as input to other
modules, offering a coordinated information exchange between different parts
of  the brain (Baars,  2005; Dehaene et  al.,  2006; Dennett,  2001).  It  is  not a
specialized center or area in the brain: there is no evidence that consciousness
would be a specific property of any neural processor, because all parts of the
brain appear to be involved in non-conscious processing; rather it is the global
information distribution that creates consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006;
Zeki & Bartels, 1999). Global distribution of visual information has been
suggested  to  be  dependent  on  recurrent  processing,  that  is,  a  reciprocal
relationship between extrastriate visual cortices and prefrontal cortices,
mediated by long-range cortico-cortical feedforward and feedback projections
(Koch & Tsuchiya, 2006; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011).
Not all information from the numerous modules are, nor can be,
broadcasted to the whole brain. Phenomena such as backward masking,
binocular rivalry and inattentional blindness show that visual consciousness
has a limited capacity (Baars, 2005; Cohen, Dennett, & Kanwisher, 2016) that
is often contrary to people’s intuitions. For example, in the famous study
where research participants are asked to count the number of passes in a
basketball game, most of them are unaware of a man in a gorilla suit crossing
the field of play (Simons & Chabris, 2000). Hence, the task-specific focus of
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attention appears to block task-irrelevant visual information from becoming
conscious. Attention thus regulates the access of the information to the
consciousness: it amplifies the local neural activation and distributes it to
other  parts  of  the  brain,  creating  mutual  amplification  loops  (Baars,  2005;
Dehaene et al., 2006). In this way, coordinated information exchange in the
brain is dependent on attention.
When attention blocks visual information from becoming conscious, the
activation does not spread globally from the visual cortex to other areas of the
brain (Baars, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2006). Some weak activation still occurs
outside the visual cortex, though: despite the absence of top-down
amplification, this preconscious processing can guide rapid, transient and
stereotyped  behaviors  that  are  based  on  feed-forward  information  (Crick  &
Koch,  2003).  Many  of  our  everyday  behaviors  are  based  on  such  automatic
behaviors, so our limited attentional capacity is available for other duties
(Koch & Tsuchiya, 2006). When attention is directed towards the object or an
event, but the local neuronal activation in the visual cortex is too weak to
become globally distributed even with top-down activation, for example due
to short presentation times, the object can still affect behavior subliminally for
a short time, but it does not become conscious (Dehaene et al., 2006). Top-
down (selective) attention is not, therefore, synonymous with consciousness
(Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2006).
Subliminal, non-conscious activation can spread widely in the brain and
can initiate several complex processes. Only conscious information, however,
can be routed strategically into and through several stages in multi-stage
processing. Subliminally perceived information, therefore, has no role in tasks
that require using perceptual information as the input to subsequent processes
(Dehaene et al., 2014). Additionally, only conscious representations can be
used in the strategic guidance of attention (Naccache, 2005), or can determine
voluntary actions (Morsella et al., 2016). Without both attention and adequate
activation, neural activity remains unconscious (Dehaene et al., 2006) 2.
Accumulating evidence suggests that subjective richness of visual
experience is based on backwards connections and recurrent processing: First,
bottom-up connections offer a gist of the visible scene, then top-down
amplification enables the examination of details, resulting in recurrent
2 There are also other ways to define conscious states.  Ned Block (1995),  for  instance,  suggests  a
division between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, the contents of which are
available for reporting and symbolic cognitive functions in general. The contents of phenomenal
consciousness become access conscious, when attention is directed to them. This definition of
phenomenal consciousness is empirically problematic, as it is impossible to gather knowledge about
phenomena that are, by definition, unreportable. Otherwise, a phenomenal consciousness outside of
access consciousness appears to be an illusion (Cohen & Dennett, 2011): for example, although we have
illusory  experience  that  the  whole  visual  scene  has  colors,  humans  are  only  able  to  extract  color
information through the fovea of the eye.
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processing and thus conscious experience (Crick & Koch, 2003; Hochstein &
Ahissar,  2002;  Kravitz  et  al.,  2013;  Lamme,  2006).3 The  feeling  that
consciousness itself is a rich and static representation of the environment in
the brain is therefore somewhat illusory or virtual: by focusing and moving our
eyes,  we  can  bring  detailed  visual  information  to  our  experience,  but  this
information exists  in consciousness only as long as attention is  guided to it
(Blackmore,  Brelstaff,  Nelson,  &  TroĞcianko,  1995).  Otherwise  we  rely  on
simple  gist,  which  summarizes  the  statistical  properties  of  the  environment
(Cohen et  al.,  2016;  Koch  &  Tsuchiya,  2006).  Attention  guides  information
acquisition that is active and purposeful; it follows the current activities and
thoughts of the observer (Cohen et al., 2016; O’Regan & Noë, 2001).
An ambiguous figure. The figure can be seen as either a rabbit or as a duck but
never both at the same time.
The  information  that  enters  consciousness  is  suggested  to  be  supra-
modular (Morsella, 2005) – it represents information that already integrates
results  from  several  individual  modules,  also  over  different  modalities.  For
example, we do not perceive separately the sounds and the movements of lips
when  someone  talks  (McGurk  &  MacDonald,  1976),  instead  these  two
elements  form  a  meaningful  whole  to  the  listener.  Perception  is  thus
automatically  interpreted.  Similarly,  we can see only one interpretation at  a
time in ambiguous figures (Figure 1). We can change between interpretations
but we cannot see a rabbit and a duck at the same time. This ensures that our
perceptions stay coherent (Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005), which is based on
mutual communication between different areas of the brain (Zeki & Bartels,
1999). Hence, it has been suggested that consciousness consists of ‘mid-level’
representations; the high-level contextual representations, or interpretations,
guide attention and make experiences conscious but they themselves remain
unconscious; also the low-level processing of visual features is non-conscious
3 It is worth noting that although Lamme (2006), Crick and Koch (2003) and Dehaene et al. (2006)
agree on the recurrent processing as a definite requirement for conscious experience, they differ in other
respects. Lamme (2006), in addition, even distinguishes between reportability and consciousness, thus
diverging from other authors and this dissertation where operationalization of consciousness is
concerned.
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(Prinz,  2000).  As  a  demonstration  of  the  way  experiences  are  shaped  by
contexts we not may not be aware (Baars, Ramsoy, & Laureys, 2003), the duck-
rabbit is more often seen as a rabbit near Easter (Brugger & Brugger, 1993).
In  the  case  of  image  quality,  which  is  the  context  of  this  thesis,
interpretation of the visual scene determines how different visual features are
experienced by the observer. For example, naïve observers may not perceive a
certain  luminance  level  and  color  combination  as  separate  sensations,  but
interpret  the  image  content  and  perceive  the  scene  as  sunny  or  overcast  in
relation to the content of the image (see Figure 2). The already-interpreted
nature of subjective experience is of course central to the ability to behave in a
coordinated  manner;  if  our  phenomenal  consciousness  would  consist  of
fragmented information with contradictory data only, without clear meanings,
everyday behavior would be impossible. The role of subjective experience is
therefore to guide coherent behavior by offering unambiguous perceptual
experience as a basis for voluntary decisions between different actions (Jack &
Shallice, 2001; Morsella et al., 2016).
How interpretation of the scene affects experience. Figure b has reduced brightness
and bluish tint. It is seen as rainy, due to the interpretation of the image context.
1.1.2 CONSCIOUS THOUGHT
In addition to sensory experiences and feelings at the immediate moment,
humans have more sophisticated conscious mental states, namely conscious
thoughts,4 which can reflect current experiences, distance oneself from
current perceptions, reason, create a sense of self and infer causalities between
instances  (Baumeister  &  Masicampo,  2010;  Crick  &  Koch,  2003;  Schooler,
2002).  These  thoughts  enable  active  information  maintenance  and
manipulation in the working memory, flexible combination of information,
4 There are also other naming conventions for these different levels of awareness, such as
consciousness and meta-consciousness (Schooler, 2002) or primary consciousness and higher order
consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003). The dichotomy is nevertheless between the ‘pure’ subjective
experiences and more reflective mental states that can distance one from current perceptions and can
evaluate, for instance, the consequences of different actions in the future.
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following rules in a precise and selective manner, and deliberation using
mental simulations of the costs and benefits of the actions (Baumeister &
Masicampo, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010). When
the contents of phenomenal consciousness refer, say, to the pure experience of
‘redness,’ conscious thinking may consist of reflective thought about ‘redness,’
for instance, “I am seeing red” or “the redness in his face in this image makes
him  look  sick.”  That  someone  appears  sick  in  an  image  is  also  a  subjective
experience; the reflective thought is the mental process that relates sickness to
the redness in this case, and assumes a causal relation between these
experiences (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010). In some other case, e.g.
without the presence of a human face, the image may be experienced as more
reddish,  warm  and  more  atmospheric.  Conscious  thought  in  this  case  may
create a causal link between redness, warmth and a better atmosphere.
Narratives link experiences together, and they can be used for understanding
similar  events  in  the  future  or  the  past  (Baumeister  &  Masicampo,  2010).
Without them our conscious self would lack order and coherence (Gallagher,
2000; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010; Turk, Heatherton, Neil Macrae, Kelley, &
Gazzaniga, 2003). As the topic of this dissertation concerns explaining one’s
judgments and decisions, this kind of causal reasoning is central to my theme.
Whereas phenomenal consciousness integrates sensory inputs and enables
an animal to act coherently in its physical environment, conscious human
thought integrates phenomenal consciousness with cultural and social
demands and coordinates behavior in the social environment (Baumeister &
Masicampo, 2010; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). With the ability to think
consciously about different alternatives, a human individual can simulate the
consequences of different actions, for example the possible reactions of other
people. This ability enables understanding of others, understanding of oneself
and making one understandable to others by explaining one’s actions. Each
member of a social group can evaluate the arguments for each alternative and
offer one’s own arguments for open discussion (Baumeister et al., 2017; Frith,
2012; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). This benefits decision making in groups and
enables an individual to learn the cultural norms concerning decision making
and valid arguments.
A commonly held naïve view suggests that the conscious self is responsible
for generating most behavior and is able to perceive surroundings in an
accurate way. However, both of these assumptions appear to be illusions
(Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). According to the
current view, conscious thinking instead generates and modifies intentional
action plans or schemas that are otherwise executed rather automatically
(Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000),
such as “after breakfast, I will drive to work.” When we have a conscious plan
to drive to work, we do not need to consciously stay on the right (or left) side
of  the  road,  because  we  have  learned  to  do  it  automatically.  The  illusion  of
conscious control is probably related to the fact that we could take control of
each voluntary muscle, but there is rarely any need to do so. As long as our
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behavior is consistent with our goals and conscious thoughts, we feel that we
are in control of our actions (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Doris, 2018;
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
However, when we must take a more controlled approach to a specific task,
for example because it is unfamiliar, an organized form of conscious thought,
inner speech, comes to help and appears to have a significant role in the
voluntary guidance of action and goal-directed action (Bastian et al., 2017).
Inner speech enables the following of explicit verbal rules, for instance when
learning, by activating neural circuits endogenically (Baars, 2005): it guides
attention to thoughts and therefore controls thinking (and thus behavior) by
using words as pointers to specific action plans (Martínez-Manrique &
Vicente, 2010). Internal monologue thus often accompanies skill acquisition
(M. D. Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002) and verbalization can
significantly improve learning in certain tasks, for example in dynamic
decisions by guiding attention to relevant information in the right instances
(Berry,  1983;  Berry  &  Broadbent,  1987).  Impending  inner  speech  with
articulatory suppression can distract the functioning of voluntary attention
when the individual is required to alternate between tasks (Baddeley,
Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001; Emerson & Miyake, 2003). This can induce mind-
wandering, as people’s ability to focus attention by means of inner speech is
weakened (Bastian et al., 2017). This focusing of strategic attention appears to
be specifically linked to language; suppressing visual or auditory processing
does not have an effect on mind-wandering. Inner speech is salient to
introspection, emphasizing the importance of the controlling role of language
in conscious thoughts.
Conscious thoughts can influence subjective experience (Winkielman &
Schooler, 2011): reading a book or a news story, for instance, may induce
strong emotions. Social environment can therefore affect our experiences
greatly via the use of language. Language, on the other hand, can make fuzzy
experiences more precise by naming them (Colombetti, 2009). Thus, when
people explain their judgments, their subjective explanations reflect the
interaction between the experience and conscious thoughts rather than being
a  one-directional  transform  of  experience  into  verbal  description.  As
mentioned earlier, thoughts guide attention (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) and
attention alters experiences by shifting the focus onto different aspects of
experience (Lee, Frederick, & Ariely, 2006; Tse, Reavis, Kohler, Caplovitz, &
Wheatley, 2013; Yamada et al., 2014). What follows is that individuals’
thoughts can become dissociated from their original experiences, for example
due to social pressure, when thoughts direct attention away from some
relevant aspects of the original experience (Winkielman & Schooler, 2011).
Explaining can therefore interfere with judgments that are based on subjective
experience, leading to changes in preferences (McGlone, Kobrynowicz, &
Alexander, 2005; Wilson et al., 1993; Yamada, 2009).
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1.2 JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
How does the dynamic and multidimensional experience then become a one-
dimensional rating or categorical choice? For example, when asked to judge
image quality and to choose the better of two images, we may experience the
first as having somewhat faded colors, but at the same time, we see it is also
clear and well-lit. In the other image, colors can be brighter, but it is dark and
fuzzy. How do we decide which of the alternatives is better? Psychological
research on judgment and decision making (JDM) aims to explain, among
other things, the ways people integrate such multidimensional information
into preferential judgments when they have to make a choice between two or
more alternatives. In these cases, people may be required to take into account
several attributes, which have a different subjective importance (Bettman,
Luce,  &  Payne,  1998).  For  example,  the  choice  of  an  apartment  may  be
dependent  on  such  attributes  as  location,  size,  price  and  condition,  each  of
these having a different importance or attribute weight.
The psychology of JDM has been heavily influenced by Herbert Simon’s
idea of bounded rationality, which refers to the cognitive and contextual
limitations in human decision making (H. A. Simon, 1955). People do not have,
for instance, endless time to deliberate their every decision. Another
influential view has been the idea that people may not have well-defined
preferences, but the preferences are often constructed on-line when
individuals are confronted by choices: they reach decisions by conducting a
conscious calculation about the attributes of the alternatives and not by
referring to existing preferences (Bettman et al., 1998). As human conscious
thinking is limited in several respects, these calculations and hence rationality
has been assumed to be bounded by these limitations. The most important
limitations in human conscious thinking are caused by the working memory
capacity and serial processing (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
It has been assumed that people can overcome the computational limits of
their conscious thinking by using different strategies or heuristics on the basis
of the needs of the current decision (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). When
human decision making behavior does not follow the principles of normative
rationality,  the  reason  for  this  has  therefore  been  assigned  to  bounded
rationality and to the accompanying strategies that people use. For example,
when people fail to follow the rule of transitivity, it could be explained by the
use of a certain strategy that ignores part of the information (Tversky, 1969)5.
Until recently, the study of judgment and decision making has not given
much attention to the role of consciousness. When discussion on the bounded
rationality has referred to the computational limitations of human cognitions,
it has implicitly assumed that rational judgment and decision making is based
5 Intransitivity occurs when individual’s pair-wise choices of three alternatives, A, B and C, follow a
pattern of preference where A ظ B,  B ظ C and C ظ A, where ظ indicates preference. In other words,
alternatives cannot be ordered, which contradicts the axiom of transitivity in rational economic behavior.
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on the processes that  are based on conscious thought,  or analytic thinking,
which is usually described as slow, conscious, deliberative, serial and
controlled (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier,
1996; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000).
Subjective experiences, as results of intuitive, non-conscious processes
were, for a long time, described as a source of biases and irrationalities that
prevent rational behavior. This dual-process view, contrasting between
analytic and intuitive cognition, has become widely known, especially when
Daniel Kahneman received a Nobel Prize in economics. Kahneman’s (2003)
research program was based on revealing biases in human reasoning and
decision  making  and  explaining  these  biases  by  referring  to  a  wide  set  of
heuristics that occur within intuitive thinking. Within this ‘heuristics and
biases’ tradition, judgments and decisions that somehow break the rules of
rationality have been attributed to intuition, whereas normative behavior has
been associated with the use of reason, or conscious, analytic cognition. This
is also in line with folk psychological ideas about rationality.
It indeed appears that conscious thought influences rationality by enabling
the application of culturally shared normative rules or other people’s advice in
decisions (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011; Briley, Morris, & Simonson,
2010; Frith, 2012; Hofmann & Wilson, 2010), which people gradually learn to
apply automatically (Baumeister et al., 2011). Conscious thinking is also
assumed to benefit tasks requiring reasoning or manipulation of exact
information, such as numbers (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987;
McMackin  &  Slovic,  2000;  Reyna,  2012;  Rusou,  Zakay,  &  Usher,  2013).
Conscious thought can integrate behavior across time, as individuals can
reflect their previous actions and accommodate their decisions according to
them; without consciousness people would respond only to immediate inputs
(Baumeister et al., 2011). Conscious thought can therefore facilitate rationality
by increasing consistency in the long run, by creating meaning for a series of
actions: Gazzaniga (1989), for example, suggests that the left-brain
‘interpreter’ constructs theories about actions and experiences by generating
hypotheses about the causal chains behind the actions. Although these
hypotheses can be seriously wrong, explicit hypotheses about the reasons for
successful decisions can also be utilized in future decisions, which enhances
learning (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Frith, 2012; Hagafors & Brehmer,
1983). These hypotheses are thus tested and wrong hypotheses can be
discarded.
Contrasting the traditional view of analytic thinking as the source of
rationality, attitudes towards the role of consciousness have traditionally been
more skeptical in the social psychological research tradition (Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Also the
study of the naturalistic decision making among different professionals
suggest that expertise is mostly based on intuitive skills, not on rational
reasoning (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Lipshitz, Klein, & Orasanu, 2001; Reyna,
2012): many experts categorize situations rapidly and follow an action plan
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associated with that categorization (Klein, 1993). No conscious evaluation
between alternatives is usually made. These perspectives and additional
neuropsychological evidence have had much influence on the contemporary
view that rationality is not synonymous with conscious reasoning and
irrationality with emotions or results of non-conscious processes present in
subjective experience. Damasio (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994),
for instance, has shown that the human ability to decide is largely dependent
on emotions: damage in the brain areas that process emotional information
can severely distract people’s ability from making rational decisions, or
decisions at all, in spite of their intact intellectual abilities. The role of affect in
rational  decision  making  has  also  been  supported  with  some  experimental
evidence (Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009; Pham, 2007). In general, affect appears
to be the ‘common currency’ between alternatives that are otherwise difficult
to  prioritize  (Weber  &  Johnson,  2009).  Our  everyday  lives  tend  to  rely  on
automatic routines, or intuition; additional deliberation can, in fact, can cause
confusion in many ways by interfering with established routines and
intuitions, making us uncertain about our preferences (Betsch, 2011;
Simonson, 1989; Wilson et al., 1989).
Generally, the role of conscious thinking in JDM has probably been
overestimated (Williams & Poehlman, 2017). In the previous section it was
pointed out that we usually feel control over our behaviors as long as they are
consistent with our goals and thoughts (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Gallagher,
2000; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). It also appears that it is an important
human tendency to create meaningful narratives for events (Epstein, 1994;
Gazzaniga, 1989) or arguments for judgments and decisions (Mercier &
Sperber, 2011), without significant effort. This occurs even when there is no
information available (Turk et al., 2003). The low amount of effort suggests
that this is an automatic, or intuitive, feature of human thought. Interestingly,
some experiments suggest that conscious thoughts can be evoked
unintentionally by perceptions, even against one’s intentions (Bhangal, Allen,
Geisler, & Morsella, 2016). Analytic thinking, on the other hand, involves
effort, voluntary manipulation and critical assessment or examination of the
arguments or narratives. The fact that judgmental processes are accompanied
by thoughts, therefore does not necessarily mean that the judgments are based
on thoughts (Williams & Poehlman, 2017). This might explain why people feel
that their behaviors are directly caused by thoughts.
It  now  appears  widely  accepted  that  processes  that  are  not  based  on
conscious deliberation can sometimes be superior in JDM, especially in
complex  decisions  (Dijksterhuis,  2004;  Glöckner  &  Betsch,  2008b;  Levine,
Halberstadt, & Goldstone, 1996; Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner, & Zakay,
2011). Automatic processes offer efficiency and speed and therefore they are
used in most everyday decisions and judgments. These processes, working
outside conscious thought, are not overloaded with information and function
faster than conscious deliberation.
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Intuition is regarded as a common name for this diverse set of automatic
processes that function outside our conscious awareness so that only the
results of these processes become phenomenally conscious as experiences
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Gore & Sadler-Smith, 2011). Intuitive thinking is
based on learning (Hogarth, 2001; Reyna, 2012) and it is linked with expertise
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Although some authors suggest that these non-
conscious, intuitive processes follow similar rules as conscious thinking
(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), others suggest that intuitive thinking is free
from the limitations of conscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006;
Glöckner  &  Betsch,  2008b;  Usher  et  al.,  2011):  when  the  capacity-limited
working  memory  is  not  needed,  there  is  no  need  to  restrict  the  amount  of
information, which can be automatically processed in parallel with effective
associative mechanisms, without voluntary control (Glöckner & Betsch,
2008a; D. Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001). These pattern recognition
mechanisms  aim  to  find  a  decision  which  maximizes  the  coherency  of  the
solution and minimizes the conflict that is involved in the choice. This often
includes decreasing the weight of the conflicting information and increasing
the  weight  of  the  coherent  information.  This  is  in  line  with  the  property  of
subjective  experience  to  present  the  world  as  coherent  and  non-conflicting:
the solutions to the decision problems resemble the unique gestalts familiar
from perceptual psychology. The pattern recognition view of automatic JDM
contrasts with the traditional multiple-strategy view, or ‘adaptive toolbox’
approach, which suggests that people adapt to different decision making
requirements by changing the algorithmic strategies that they use (Glöckner &
Betsch, 2012; Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014).
Therefore it has been suggested that information integration in decision
making is mostly automatic and non-conscious, without the intervention of
the  working  memory,  and  it  is  actually information acquisition where
deliberation can sometimes have a crucial role (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren,
2006; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). The former process is responsible for
weighting and integrating information about each alternative into gist
representation,  on  which  a  decision  is  then  made  (Abadie,  Waroquier,  &
Terrier, 2013). The gist summarizes the information about the alternatives and
therefore facilitates the comparison between alternatives when the amount of
information is large. The information acquisition process, on the other hand,
helps to bring all the decision-relevant information into consciousness and it
is based on the use of voluntary attention in the guidance of conscious
thoughts. Information search can be slow and can require great effort; in such
cases fast and frugal heuristics can be highly useful (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the
ABC Research Group, 1999).
After being presented in the phenomenal consciousness, this information
is available for automatic decision processes (Morsella et al., 2016). Recent
experiments on unconscious thought phenomena suggest that representing
the relevant information in consciousness in a specific way is required in order
for the unconscious information integration processes to work properly
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(Abadie, Villejoubert, Waroquier, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Nordgren, Bos,
& Dijksterhuis, 2011). Conscious thought, on the other hand, can help
overcome the biases in how information is sought and brought into
phenomenal consciousness (e.g. Kahneman, 2003), not in how it is integrated.
Sometimes, the first impression in subjective experience as such is not
enough to determine a clear preference, and additional, conscious reasoning
is required to come up with a resolution. In unfamiliar contexts, an individual
may not able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant dimensions
(Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999) and there might not be existing routines to follow
(Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Verplanken, Aarts, & van Knippenberg, 1997).
Such is the case where the individual has not yet learned intuitions related to
the  task  in  question.  As  a  result,  subjective  experience  may  lack  a  clear
preference dimension and may consist of more than one relevant dimensions
and the individual must consciously determine the importance of these
dimensions in order to determine the preference order of the alternatives.
Fluent processing appears to be a sign that informs the individual that
learned automatic processes are working well and means a greater confidence
in intuition (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). Conflict tends to
distract fluent, automatic processing, shifting the process to a more
deliberative mode and the individual can apply more flexible voluntary
processes.  Activation  of  the  anterior  cingulate  cortex  has  been  found  to  be
associated with decision conflicts, and this activates the prefrontal cortex
which is responsible for controlled processes (Alter et al., 2007; Botvinick,
2007; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010). In the
case of JDM, reason-based processes are activated when the alternatives
appear to be equally appealing, unpleasant or conflicting (Shafir, Simonson, &
Tversky, 1993).
Morsella et al. (2016) suggest that the function of phenomenal
consciousness is to represent those kinds of conflicts that involve selections
between different action plans or choices. Therefore it appears that knowing
these dimensions of experience is crucial for understanding on what subjective
information the decisions and judgments are based. This was the underlying
idea in the development of the interpretation-based quality method.
1.3 INTERPRETATION-BASED QUALITY APPROACH
This dissertation stems from the Interpretation-Based Quality (IBQ)
approach (Nyman, 2010; Nyman et al., 2010, 2008, 2006; Nyman, Radun,
Leisti,  &  Vuori,  2005;  Radun et  al.,  2008).  As  it  has  been  discussed  so  far,
human subjective experience is dependent on personal factors, such as
learning history and interpretation of the stimuli. Individual preferences, on
the other hand, tend to be dependent on how people experience the stimuli.
Therefore,  preferences  should  be  both  subjective  and  contingent  on  how
stimuli  are  experienced.  The  IBQ  approach  was  developed  to  find  the
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dimensions of experience that determine decisions related to subjective
preferences. The basis of this method is a combination of psychometric
evaluation of quality and qualitative description of subjective dimensions of
quality.
Psychometric evaluation usually means a combination of judgment and
decision: for example, in the paired comparison method participants are asked
to judge which of the presented images is better and choose it accordingly; or
when participants are asked to rate the quality of single images on a scale from
1 to 10, for example, they are asked to decide which numerical value they would
assign to the stimuli on the basis of their judgment. The resulting quantitative
data  informs,  for  example,  how  a  certain  image  signal  processor  (ISP)  in  a
digital camera performs in comparison with other processors. These values are
usually reported as the mean opinion scores (MOS), which simply averages
test participants’ ratings that are given to a specific image. In the field of digital
cameras several standards, both objective and subjective, have been developed
for the measurement of image quality.
The  MOS  has  traditionally  been  defined  as  the  target  for  objective  or
computational methods for measuring image quality automatically, directly
from the images. The purpose of the objective image quality (IQ) metrics is to
avoid tests involving human observers, which are labor-intensive and
expensive. In many cases, subjective testing is not even possible. For example,
the information stream in a digital television system can be optimized by using
objective IQ metrics automatically, on-line. The development of these
objective metrics is a field of study which has a history of over 40 years and
the number of developed metrics has increased at a fast pace (Pedersen, 2015).
As a result, objective IQ metrics are ubiquitous. For example, an objective IQ
metric  called  SSIM  (Wang,  Bovik,  Sheikh,  &  Simmoncelli,  2004)  won  a
Primetime Emmy Award in 2015 for its wide use in digital television quality
control. SSIM as well as many other metrics (e.g. visual information fidelity,
VIF; Sheikh & Bovik, 2006) try to approach IQ by mimicking the human visual
system. The incorporation of this low-level neural knowledge in objective
metrics is not a final solution for reliable IQ measurement as the correlation
between the MOS values and the results of these metrics is far from perfect. In
a recent evaluation of 60 state-of-the-art metrics, none reached the linear
correlation of .80 with subjective ratings (Pedersen, 2015).
Contrary to the approach that aims to measure image quality physically,
directly from the images, the IBQ paradigm emphasizes the subjectivity of the
quality evaluation, high-level vision, decision making processes and the end-
user point of view: participants are naïve – as end-users usually are – and they
are told that there are no right or wrong answers. This subjective perspective
can cause unpredictable variations in quality evaluations that are beyond the
capabilities of objective metrics that are based on low-level vision. In the IBQ,
the instructions and research set-ups are based on standard practices in
experimental psychology and are therefore designed to provide as reliable as
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possible data from individual participants (e.g. Nuutinen, Virtanen, Leisti,
Mustonen, & Radun, 2016).
In order to understand the subjective evaluation process more thoroughly,
the IBQ method requires a subjective explanation for each decision. Usually
participants are simply asked to give the reasons on which their judgments are
based,  by  referring  in  their  own words  to  the  properties  of  the  images.  The
assumption is that these explanations reveal something of the experience on
which the evaluation is based. From these explanations, relevant attributes of
the decisions are sought by using an appropriate qualitative coding scheme,
usually  grounded  theory  (Strauss  &  Corbin,  1998),  which  emphasizes  the
participants as the only source of the decision attributes. Thus, analysis is not
made with any predetermined attribute set defined by the researchers, neither
are the participants given a ready-made set of attributes that should be used.
Coding of the explanation data is an iterative process, where the coder first
gathers all the attributes that have been used by the participants, and after this
open coding phase, synonyms or very similar codes are gradually merged
(Radun et al., 2008). Finally, the attributes that have only been used a few
times and cannot be merged with other codes are discarded. The result of the
coding is a set of subjective attributes that is assumed to describe the relevant
dimensions of a quality experience among the evaluated samples. This data
can give a qualitative description of the factors that differentiate between good
and bad quality in different contexts, such as camera use cases.
1.3.1 BACKGROUND FOR THE IBQ METHOD
1.3.1.1 Semantic gap between objective measurable properties and
subjective attributes of quality
The initial reason for the development of the IBQ method was the semantic
gap, which was found between the low-level perceptual properties of the visual
stimuli and the relevant subjective concepts that people used when describing
their experience of the quality of visual products (Eerola et al., 2011; Radun,
Nuutinen,  Leisti,  &  Häkkinen,  2016).  This  gap  was  especially  large  in  the
context of print quality of high-quality magazines, where the visual properties
of the paper had a major impact on the impression that the magazine made on
the consumer. Although the objective differences between prints concerned
mainly such low-level properties as color, gloss or lightness, participants could
use  such  concepts  as  ‘warm,’  ‘soft,’  ‘  bright’  or  ‘clean’  to  describe  their
experience  of  quality  (Eklund,  2001;  Leisti,  2003).  It  may  appear  to  be
relatively easy to theorize associations between these subjective concepts and
the objective paper properties post hoc, but, however, no current theories of
visual perception predict the quality experience of the participants, nor the
ratings that participants give, because their decisions are based on subjective
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interpretations (Radun et al., 2016). Therefore, the participants’ interpretation
of the objective properties of the stimuli were emphasized in the method.
The IBQ approach aims at subjective-to-objective mapping, which first
defines  the  relevant  phenomena  occurring  in  the  subjective  experience  and
then seeks the objective parameters that could explain the occurrence of these
phenomena (see Albertazzi, 2013; Felin, Koenderink, & Krueger, 2017). Using
the data provided by the IBQ method, it is possible, for example, to build
computational models that predict both quality experiences and ratings from
the objectively measurable visual properties (e.g. Eerola et al., 2011). Without
knowing the relevant subjective dimensions, this is impossible.
A similar approach was prominent in gestalt psychology and it is still widely
used in vision science, for example, when visual illusions are used to study how
the human visual system works (Albertazzi, 2013). This is in contrast to the
traditional paradigm in psychophysics that first defines the relevant objective
parameters and then measures the related dimensions in psychological
experience (objective-to-subjective mapping). In the history of psychology,
Gestalt psychology emerged from criticism towards psychophysics, and the
idea that subjective experience could be understood by dividing it into its
constituents, and the physical counterparts of these constituents. Gestalt
psychology relied on phenomenological ideas that emphasize the special
character of subjective experience (Albertazzi, 2013).
1.3.1.2 Multidimensionality of subjective quality and the inverse
problem
An important and inherent aspect of quality experience is its
multidimensionality, whereas the quality rating typically informs only about
product’s location on a one-dimensional (good-bad, for example) quality
dimension. For instance, the performance of digital cameras is dependent on
several attributes. When the aim is to enhance quality and one has only data
about quality ratings and of large number of camera’s physical parameters, it
is difficult to know how the camera quality could be enhanced. IBQ offers data
which  can  be  used  when  solving  this inverse problem faced by engineers
optimizing the imaging systems. Simple preference ordering often results in
rather trivial data, leaving engineers and designers to guess the reasons why
their products fail to reach the maximum level of quality.
1.3.1.3 Context-dependency of quality
Quality is context-dependent. Objective differences could be interpreted
differently  in  different  image  contents,  or  in  different  products,  such  as
magazines, and these different interpretations can lead to different judgments
(Radun et al., 2008). Not only are image contents rated differently, objective
image parameters are experienced differently in different contents. In terms
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of  IBQ,  the decision space, which is reflected in the subjective quality
attributes, differs between different images, even when the objective
differences are similar (Nyman, 2010; Nyman et al., 2010). Manipulating
sharpness, for example, can induce different interpretations, depending on the
content  or  the  evaluator  (Radun  et  al.,  2008):  if  a  blur  in  an  image  is
interpreted as ‘artistic’, it is rated better than when it is interpreted as
‘unsharp.’ Figure 2 further illustrates this context dependency: Figure 2a is the
original  image  from  a  digital  camera,  2b  is  the  manipulated  version  with  a
change  in  luminance  level  and  color  balance.  The  difference  between  the
images can be interpreted as a difference in luminance level and color balance,
but it can also be interpreted in relation to the image content, as a difference
between two weather conditions: image a being shot in clearer sunny weather
conditions, whereas image b is shot in wetter rainy weather.
How does the knowledge of phenomenal consciousness relate to the
judgment of quality? The traditional approaches to image quality have been
heavily influenced by psychophysics. The overall quality of an image is
conceptualized as a combination of component attributes, or ‘nesses,’ such as
sharpness, graininess, colorfulness, etc. (Engeldrum, 1999), which are further
perceptual counterparts of combinations of certain objective, or physical
properties of an image. The traditional view further has been that the
combined effect of the physical quality parameters can be mathematically
calculated from the effects of separate attributes using proper formula, such
as Minkowski summation (Engeldrum, 1999; Keelan, 2002). However, the
findings concerning the interpretative nature of subjective experience are
problematic to any approach that aims to predict multidimensional subjective
experiences on a psychophysical basis (Nyman et al., 2008): qualitative
phenomena  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical  stimuli,  as  they  come  with
interpretation, or meaning, which is assigned to the stimuli by the observer
(Albertazzi, 2013). In JDM, meanings are further associated with personal
learning and point of view (Reyna, 2012). The IBQ specifically aims to find out
these meanings.
1.3.1.4 Subjectivity is not an error
Computational methods that try to predict human preferences directly from
the physical properties of images are deterministic and have only a single
ranking  or  rating  of  the  alternative  (Lin  &  Jay  Kuo,  2011;  Pedersen,  2015).
They are tuned so that they would as closely as possible imitate the average
judgments of humans, and differences between the ratings made by different
individuals  are  therefore  treated  as  unwanted  errors.  However,  human
preferences are subjective and can be dependent on the personal background
and  cultural  factors  (Bourdieu,  1984).  Generally,  perceived  reality  is  not
independent  of  the  observer  (Felin  et  al.,  2017),  and  this  manifests  in no-
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reference image quality6 in particular: when a scene is captured by several
cameras,  none  of  them can  be  defined  as  the  objective  truth  about  how the
scene really looks; images can only be subjectively ranked on the basis of how
well they match with the human observer’s subjective visual experience of the
scene. Color balance and lightness levels in photographs do not have one
objectively correct level; instead, many possible, equally natural solutions exist
(Felin  et  al.,  2017).  What  is  the  right  solution  is  dependent  on  the
interpretation. So, when different individuals give different ratings, it is not
necessarily an error for they may experience the differences differently, as each
subjective phenomenon is connected to a single point of view (Nagel, 1974).
The differences in how things are experienced are not trivial, when they are
found, for example, between different consumer segments.
Different introspections for the same stimuli were regarded as an
unpassable obstacle for studying conscious phenomena at the beginning of the
20th century (Ericsson,  2003).  This led to the use of  meaningless stimuli  in
cognitive psychology, so that different interpretations do not interfere with the
cognitive processes being studied. That subjective experiences of introspective
observers  differ  is  not  a  weakness  in  methodology,  however,  but  a
manifestation of individual differences (Costall, 2006): the subjectively
experienced  world  is  an  important  aspect  of  human  life.  Meaning  is  an
inseparable property in many everyday cognitive processes (e.g. Reyna, 2012).
Therefore IBQ stresses the subjective point of  view and interpretations that
are assumed to mediate how physical targets are evaluated.
1.3.1.5 The dimensions of judgment are subjective
Finally, and most importantly, the IBQ method relies on attribute data that is
spontaneously produced by the research participants. The usual procedure to
gather self-report data is to use Likert scales: for example, participants may be
asked whether the image is sharp, colorful, natural, grainy, etc. Likert scales
provide data that is quantitative and is usually normally distributed, that is,
data that is easy to analyze quantitatively using standard methodology. The
weakness  of  this  approach  is  that  we  may  not  know a priori the personally
relevant attributes of the judgment, and, more importantly, we do not know
whether a certain participant really uses these attributes when not asked
about them.
Personally relevant attributes are associated with a certain interpretation
of the task and are accompanied by a specific information acquisition strategy
(Radun et al., 2016). The real danger is that asking participants to make
judgments on predefined attribute scales, their attention is diverted towards
6 Image quality metrics are divided into full-reference, reduced-reference or no-reference types
depending on the existence of an original, or reference image, which represents the highest quality
example of the image which has not yet been, for example, compressed or transmitted. Reduced-
reference metrics usually have some meta-data available about the original image.
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these attributes in their judgments, instead of their initial focus, which is based
on personally relevant attributes (Leisti, Radun, Virtanen, Halonen, & Nyman,
2009;  Radun  et  al.,  2016;  Tordesillas  &  Chaiken,  1999).  This  may  not  only
distract their judgments (Wilson & Schooler, 1991), it may also manipulate
their subjective experiences, which are dependent on the focus of attention
(Tse et al., 2013; Yamada et al., 2014). For example, if a participant is asked
whether the duck in the image looks left or right, we may not see the rabbit
(Figure 1). So, if the researcher is interested in the experiences, using a
predetermined scheme for evaluating the experience may in fact distract the
authentic experience that is being studied.
1.3.2 APPLICATION OF THE IBQ METHOD OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT
OF IMAGE QUALITY
The emphasis of the approach was first on the concepts that consumers and
experts used to describe the quality of high-quality magazines (i.e. prints: e.g.
Eklund, 2001; Leisti, 2003). Later, the psychometric approach in IBQ gained
more emphasis, when the method was applied to digital printing and image
quality (Leisti et al., 2009; Nyman et al., 2005), a context, which was strongly
based on the tradition of psychometrics and psychophysics (Engeldrum,
2000; Keelan, 2002). Gradually, the use of the method was extended to, for
example, video quality (Radun, Virtanen, Olives, J. L., Vaahteranoksa, Vuori,
&  Nyman,  2007),  3-D  image  quality  (Shibata  et  al.,  2009)  and  3-D  movies
(Häkkinen et al., 2008), among others. Internal validity appeared to be good
in all applications: it was shown that participants use attributes in a consistent
manner, when examined over all participants using a suitable methodology,
such as correspondence analysis (Greenacre J., 1984): attributes usually form
a clear low-dimensional space, with meaningful dimensions that can be related
to objective physical properties. The reliability of the method has been
examined as inter-rater reliability and it has ranged between fair and excellent,
depending on the attribute (Radun et al., 2008).
1.3.3 RELATED APPROACHES
1.3.3.1 Thinking-aloud method
The IBQ approach has some superficial resemblance with the verbal protocol
method (Newell & Simon, 1972), which has been employed in decision-making
research from the 1970s (e.g. Payne, 1976). A typical use of this method means
that participants are presented with decision problems, they are asked to solve
them and verbalize all their thought during the task. For example, a decision
could consist of selecting an item (such as an apartment) from a limited
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number of alternatives, which are described by a limited number of attributes
(such as rent, size or condition). Participants are only asked to think aloud, not
interpret or explain their answers (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Fox, Ericsson, &
Best, 2011). Participants’ verbalizations are recorded, transcribed and coded
according to the information search patterns the participants use. On the basis
of this qualitative analysis, conclusions are made about the decision-making
strategies of the participants. Verbal protocols (in addition to so-called
information display and gaze-tracking methodologies) are part of the process-
tracing approach that emerged to complement the structural approach to
decision making (Harte, Westenberg, & van Someren, 1994). These methods
aimed at explicating the psychological process that preceded decisions, instead
of just modeling the decisions using statistical methods such as regression
analysis, which practically regard the underlying psychological process as a
‘black box.’
In  order  to  respond  to  the  criticism  towards  introspective  methods
(particularly Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), Ericsson and Simon (1980) built a
theoretical basis for thinking-aloud methodology, where the emphasis was on
conscious thought using the working memory and a verbal code. Ericsson and
Simon  avoided  using  language  that  would  refer  to  subjective  experience  or
conscious thought, apparently to avoid the “introspectionist” stigma (see
Ericsson  &  Fox,  2011).  Nor  did  they  recommend  using  the  thinking-aloud
methodology  in  tasks  that  involve  perceptual  stimuli,  which  would  require
recoding  the  perceptual  experience  into  verbal  reasons.  Thinking  aloud  on
verbal decision problems should produce valid data, because it is assumed that
it  does  not  require  transforming  information  from  a  perceptual  to  a  verbal
code, which could lead to omissions and distortions. In other words, all the
data that is acquired, manipulated and articulated should stay in the working
memory and does not get contaminated by non-conscious processes that
cannot be verbalized. Therefore Ericsson and Simon do not warrant the use of
thinking  aloud  when  judgments  are  made  on  perceptual  stimuli.  Much
evidence has accumulated over the years to support their theory (Fox et al.,
2011).
Interpretation-Based Quality relies on a very different paradigm in
comparison to the think-aloud approach. The IBQ approach differs from these
methods in a sense that it is not focused on the process or conscious thoughts;
instead, it is supposed to reveal the subjective experience behind the
judgments, or the subjective decision space (Nyman, 2010; Nyman et al.,
2010; cf Morsella et al., 2016) that accompanies judgments of quality. This
space consists of all dimensions of subjective experience that participants
consider relevant in their judgments of quality, usually consisting of a set of
personal, subjective attributes. The IBQ method does not make strong
commitments on the strategies that are used to integrate this experiential
information into a single rating of quality (Leisti et al., 2009). It may be that
humans have direct conscious access only to the decision space represented by
the subjective experience; the processes that result in subjective experience, or
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the processes form judgments on the basis of subjective experience may well
be  unconscious  (Morsella  et  al.,  2016).  However,  it  is  possible  to  combine
descriptions of experience with process measures, such as eye movement
recordings (Radun et al., 2016).
Think-aloud methodology and the IBQ method therefore take an opposite
stance on the subjectivity of judgment and decision making. Inferring
underlying  processes  on  the  basis  of  thinking  aloud  also  requires  that
processes leading to decision are conscious. Considering the role of conscious
thinking in everyday judgments, thinking aloud can provide information about
quite a marginal sector of the whole spectrum of human JDM processes.
Although many decisions are not based on conscious thought processes, they
still require representing the information in the phenomenal consciousness in
order to become integrated into JDM processes (Nordgren et al., 2011).
1.3.3.2 Qualitative sensory evaluation methods
The IBQ method has methodological relatives in chemical sciences, in the
sensory evaluation of food and beverages. These methods specifically
concentrate on subjective experience, that is, how certain food tastes, smells
and feels. An example that is familiar to many is wine tasting. Many
magazines,  books  and  newspapers  provide  articles  where  they  offer  quality
ratings with wines and qualitative evaluation of the wine’s taste, smell and the
appearance of the wine. Qualitative description is often as relevant as the
actual rating: it informs the reader about the context of the judgment, for
example, with what kind of foods the wines should be drunk. On the basis of
these  descriptions,  consumers  can  also  get  some  kind  of  idea  whether  they
would like the wines themselves. These kinds of evaluations are, after all,
subjective, even when they are made by an expert.
Various methods for describing the taste or feel of foods and drinks exist in
the sensory evaluation tradition (Faye et al., 2004; Varela & Ares, 2012).
Methods differ according to the participant groups evaluating the product
(experts vs. naïve participants), use of evaluation made by individuals or
groups, the way experiences are described (free descriptions or consensus
vocabulary), etc. In addition to food testing, similar qualitative testing has
been used in audio quality evaluation (Lokki, 2016; Lokki, Pätynen, Kuusinen,
& Tervo, 2012; Olive, 2004) or in the evaluation of textile materials (Picard,
Dacremont, Valentin, & Giboreau, 2003), for instance. The approach in these
applications is generally pragmatic and empirical. On the other hand, these
methods  do  not  usually  claim  to  describe  the  process  of  judgment;  their
purpose is only to make the basis of quality judgments understandable.
37
1.4 CAN REASONS FOR DECISIONS BASED ON
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES BE VERBALIZED?
The underlying assumption in this dissertation is that people’s subjective
explanations for their preferences provide useful data, as the applied use of the
methods  would  suggest.  A  certain  school  of  psychological  basic  research
suggests the opposite: conscious thinking, the source of explanations, has a
rather marginal role in everyday choices that people make and people usually
manage quite well without additional deliberation. Therefore, the
explanations, as the reflections of conscious thoughts, should have little to do
with the authentic JDM process.
Furthermore, explaining appears to be a disadvantage in many tasks
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Levine, Halberstadt, &
Goldstone,  1996;  McGlone,  Kobrynowics,  &  Alexander,  2005;  McMackin  &
Slovic, 2000; Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991): when people are
asked to explain their choices, it is assumed to shift processing towards a more
conscious and analytic mode, which is unfit for certain tasks (Baumeister et
al., 2011; Chin & Schooler, 2008). Because of this shift, participants’
explanations should represent culturally plausible reasons for their
preferences, instead of the real reasons that remain inaccessible (Johansson,
Hall, Sikström, Tärning, & Lind, 2006). In the following sections, I will review
this evidence from basic research and interpret it in the context of the
assumption of the usefulness of verbal data. On the basis of this analysis, I will
define the research questions and hypotheses for this dissertation.
1.4.1 CONSCIOUS ACCESS TO HIGHER COGNITIVE PROCESSES
When  Nisbett  and  Wilson  (1977)  reviewed  the  empirical  evidence  about
people’s ability to introspect their choices, they concluded that
…there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order
cognitive processes.
Nisbett and Wilson suggested that people explained their actions by creating
causal theories about why they should have acted in the way they acted.
Usually, these should just be culturally shared ‘stock-pile’ explanations that
give a plausible causal account of the reasons for one’s actions. Similar views
have been later presented, for instance, Dennett (1991) and Gazzaniga (1989).
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) as well as philosophers like Carruthers (2010) thus
suggest that people are aware only about their mental states, not their mental
processes.
We can take an example from, say, mental states and processes related to
memory. We can recollect memories from the past and we are of course aware
of them. These are mental states. However, we are not aware about the process
that brings these past events to our minds. We can only be aware of the
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preceding memories, i.e. mental states. Similarly, it can be conceived that we
are aware of our experiences, but we are not aware of the rapid low-level
perceptual processes that either produce them or of the subsequent processes
that consume them. The latter processes may include, among others,
information integration processes that end up in decisions.
As was earlier mentioned, contemporary knowledge suggests that we first
see more general aspects, or gist, and only then examine the details (Crick &
Koch, 2003; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002). Detection of familiar objects is
extremely fast (Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996) and we are immediately able to
categorize objects in different classes. For example, we instantly perceive a
dog, but we are unable to retrieve the process that infers that a certain object
is a dog. If we are asked why we have reached that conclusion, we may explain
that the animal has four legs, it is hairy and it barks. This explanation is hardly
the  description  of  the  process,  but  a  description  of  the  culturally  shared
concept of ‘dog.’ We rather first see a dog, and then, by examining the details,
such as the number of legs and amount of hair, verify that this indeed is a dog.
Similar  decision  mechanisms,  based  on  the  immediate  recognition  of  the
situation and the accompanying solution, have been found with experts (Klein,
1993). The idea of stock-pile explanations therefore appears to have support
in the perceptual domain.
Similar categorization processes can sometimes determine our preferential
decisions as well: we are, for example, able to instantly discriminate good art
from bad art (Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009). If we are asked to explain this
judgment, we probably do not describe the underlying process; instead, we can
verbalize cultural norms about what is considered good art. Perceptual
judgments rarely come in isolation; instead, they are often accompanied by a
rich subjective experience. Becoming immersed in this experience is an
important part of aesthetic enjoyment (Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin,
2004). So, it is equally possible that we stop and think why we like something
or not, and then describe the positive and negative experiences that are related
to those pieces of art. These experiences might not be the description of the
underlying process; nevertheless, it is a description of the reasons for liking or
not liking certain art, the description of the art experience that is the basis of
the judgment.
In the case of art, this kind of description requires expertise (McGlone et
al., 2005; Yamada, 2009). When people get familiar with the targets of their
judgments, they learn to discriminate the aspects that are related to their
evaluations (Dijkstra, Van der Pligt, & Van Kleef, 2013). Instead of just judging
whether something, say beer, is more or less drinkable, an individual is able to
discriminate different aspects of taste after having more experience with
different kinds of beers (Hoeffler, Ariely, West, & Duclos, 2013). We learn to
associate certain features with good quality and certain features with bad
quality. This represents the development of expertise, or connoisseurship in
the context, and this is accompanied by the development of self-understanding
in the JDM processes (Dijkstra et al., 2013). For everyday targets, this kind of
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learning  appears  inevitable,  as  long  as  one  is  exposed  to  different  kinds  of
targets, so how different aspects affect experience can be learned (Hoeffler et
al., 2013).
It is, of course, always possible that subjective experience is not an
exhaustive explanation for our actions from the third-party viewpoint, the
perspective of the “all-seeing” researcher, who knows all the independent
variables  in  the  experiment  (e.g.  Nisbett  &  Wilson,  1977).  Still,  subjective
experience is usually an exhaustive explanation from the first-person point of
view7 (Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009). We may not be aware of the context from
which we interpret our perceptions (Baars, 2005; Zeki & Bartels, 1999), but
these interpretations are an integral part of our experience. Becoming aware
of a certain factor can change the experience, not because it has not been taken
into account before, but because the interpretation of the stimuli changes (Lee
et al., 2006). The actions of an individual are not determined by the objective
physical stimuli, but how these stimuli are interpreted and thus presented in
the phenomenal consciousness. A researcher may infer these interpretations
from subjective explanations when these explanations are compared with
objective data or other people’s explanations. From the scientific point of view,
proper experimental setting and some knowledge of what the participant is
judging is required to make the subjective interpretations understandable.
Understanding the decisions of an individual may not need a thorough
description of the process, the description of the decision space present in
phenomenal consciousness is usually enough.
Moreover, the distinction between the concepts of the mental state and the
process has been criticized (White, 1988), and it seems to ignore humans as
active perceivers. Although there are component processes that are non-
conscious, there are also processes that are under voluntary control,
information search processes in particular. As was brought up earlier,
subjective experience is not a static mental state, it results from interaction
with the environment: what we attend to greatly influences how we experience
things. Furthermore, voluntary attention appears to be very closely controlled
by the same processes as conscious thought (Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson &
Miyake, 2003). It has been experimentally shown that this also works the
other way round: Participants’ subjective reports about their mental processes
during a search task are found to correspond well with the actual eye
7 Sometimes, however, there is a wide semantic gap between the objective properties of stimuli and
the subjective experience, for example, when aesthetics are concerned: a well-designed object is
sometimes  just  beautiful,  and  it  may  be  difficult  to  verbalize  reasons  for  the  kind  of  beautifulness  it
represents, especially without formal art education. Neural representations that are activated may not
reach the level of quality that would make them conscious, but they still can affect processes on the
preconscious level (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002). Sometimes there is nothing else than a metacognitive
feeling of preference (Price & Norman, 2008). People should not be pressured into providing specific
explanations in these cases. Instead they should have the right to be unsure and still make a decision.
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movements performed by participants (Marti et al. 2015). More importantly,
false reports seem to reflect a dissociation between the strategy and eye
movements, not between the strategy and reports. This suggests that the
reports are authentic descriptions of the strategic process that guides eye
movements, not inferences that are made on the basis of overt behavior (eye
movements). Participants are found to be aware of the attention shifts that
precede eye movements even when they are not aware of the preceding primes
that caused the shifts (Reyes & Sackur, 2017).
So, as a conclusion, it appears that we can become aware of the subjective
experience itself, and learn to distinguish the relevant features in subjective
experience that are the basis for our judgments and how attention to these
different features can change the subjective experience. We should be able to
tell  what  we  are  attending,  and  we  can  become  aware  how  this  affects  our
subjective  experience  of  the  outside  world.  Concerning  the  JDM  tasks,  it
therefore seems that we can become aware of the information that is directed
at the judgment processes, and, moreover, we may influence judgments by
actively selecting information. Learning these interactions presumably has a
significant role in how we understand the aspects that influence our judgments
and decisions. Awareness of our JDM processes is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon, rather it is a learned metacognitive ability. Self-understanding
about one’s judgment processes in familiar contexts appears to be a general,
not a specific, meaning that we generally seem to understand why we like or
do not like certain things although we may not be able to access the specific
process in question.
1.4.2 EXPLANATIONS AS FABRICATIONS?
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) showed that people may not be able to report all the
relevant information that influences their choices. In other words, people may
omit this information, at least from a third-person perspective. However, more
crucial appears to be the finding that normal healthy people may fabricate the
reasons or even intentions for their choices: Johansson, Hall, Sikström and
Olsson (2005) showed a peculiar phenomenon that supports this account:
first, participants were presented faces on two cards and were asked which of
the faces they preferred. The experimenter then changed the cards (by
performing a card trick) and presented the face that the participant did not
choose and asked for explanations for that decision. Without noticing the
manipulation, a large majority of the participants ended up fabricating both
their intentions and reasons in order to explain the choices that they had not
made. No difference was found between the explanations of the manipulated
and non-manipulated trials, suggesting that the processes that produce these
explanations do not differ between these conditions (Johansson et al., 2006).
The difficulty of detecting fabrication is the fact that even if explanations
for choices correspond perfectly with the objective facts, it does not rule out
the possibility that participants fabricate the answers. It may only show that
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their  theories  about  the  reasons  for  their  choices  correspond  well  to  the
objective reality. Fabrication only becomes evident when the explanations are
obviously  wrong  (Gazzaniga,  1989;  Johansson  et  al.,  2005).  It  has  been
suggested that the causal narratives that people create to explain their own
actions do not differ from narratives that are created to explain the actions of
others (Dennett, 1991; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977;
Wilson, 2002). The study of Johansson et al. (2006) appears to support this
claim. Furthermore, some authors have concluded that conscious reasoning
plays only a small role in decision making in general and that its function is
mostly argumentative (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; cf. Baumeister & Masicampo,
2010). In other words, reasoning is supposed to justify, not determine,
intuitively derived judgments and decisions.
Nisbett & Wilson’s (1977) findings have been critically examined by authors
who emphasize the differences between interpretation and the description of
subjective experience (Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, & Carter-Thomas,
2013).  Interpretation  in  these  cases  refers  to  the  causal  inferences  that  are
created to explain why individuals acted in the way they did. The problem is
that we are not aware of this interpretative process (Carruthers, 2010), which
easily occurs when people are under social pressure to provide an explanation
for their actions. Most findings on fabrication have been based on experiments
that rely on retrospective reporting, and more importantly, on cases where
participants have not known that they would be interviewed later on the
reasons for their choices (e.g. Johansson et al., 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
It is probable that little memory traces are left in the kinds of trivial decision
tasks that have been used in the studies that have shown the human tendency
for fabrication, which appears to occur when the reasons for decisions cannot
be accessed.
True introspection should not theorize post hoc, or interpret the relations
between  mental  events,  but  should  describe  mental  states  as  they  are
(Carruthers, 2010; Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009). When participants in the
replication of Johansson et al.’s (2005) experiment were asked to concentrate
on their experiences after the presentation of the alternatives and before
explaining  their  choices,  the  number  of  participants  unable  to  notice  the
manipulation dropped significantly (Petitmengin et al., 2013). The reason why
the participants in the original experiment failed to notice the manipulation
thus appears to be that they were not paying adequate attention to their
experiences and choices.
Actually, Petitmengin and Bitbol (2009) suggest that introspection can
intensify and amplify subjective experience, when practiced properly.
Individuals should not acquire an observing stance towards their experiences
and reflect on them. Instead, the aim is to become aware of the pre-reflective
experience. In other words, they should experience, not think. Introspection
in this sense resembles approaches such as mindfulness (Tang, Hölzel, &
Posner,  2015).  Other  authors,  who  have  originally  shown  the  fallibility  of
introspection, have gradually shifted towards a view that introspection is in
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fact  an ability  (e.g.  Hofmann & Wilson,  2010; Schooler & Schreiber,  2004).
Participants’ reports therefore seem to comprise a continuum, with different
amounts of interpretation and description of subjective experience. With
appropriate instructions, it is possible to influence where the participants’
explanations are located on this continuum.
Recent findings suggest that visual experience often starts from a general
gist and then proceeds to details in the guidance of attention (Crick & Koch,
2003; Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002). According to this view, the more general
judgment of the visual scene precedes the perception of more specific
attributes (Leisti et al., 2009). Visual preferences, for example, are often based
on  processing  fluency  (Reber  et  al.,  1998),  which  can  be  experienced  as
perceptual clarity, as it makes the understanding of the image content easier.
First,  individuals  can  thus  experience  the  image  clearer,  but  on  closer
examination, by focusing attention on different parts of the image, they can
notice (and further verbalize) that the image has better contrast and less blur
and noise. They can reason that they like the image because the better contrast
and the smaller amount of blur and noise makes it clearer. The preference is
not the product of this reasoning, neither is the explanation necessarily a post
hoc rationalization. Rather it is a deepening description of integral and
dynamic subjective experience where these component experiences exist. This
dynamic, deepening experience appears to be dependent on the recurrent
processing (Kravitz et al., 2013).
To conclude, studies that have found evidence for fabrication have usually
been designed to provide support for fabrication and lack of self-
understanding, by forcing the participants to justify their preferences in
conditions  where  they  did  not  have  access  to  their  mental  states  that
determined their preferences. When the emphasis has been shifted from
justification to description of the subjective experience, the tendency to
fabricate decreases significantly. This has rather increased participants’ self-
understanding  and  made  them  aware  of  the  manipulations  made  by  the
experimenters. The issue is still mostly unsettled and requires further
research.
1.4.3 WHEN VERBALIZATION DISTRACTS AND WHEN IT BENEFITS
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS?
When there is a need to justify judgments and decisions that are difficult to
explain, it may not only evoke fabrication, but may also make individuals
uncertain  about  their  earlier  preferences  and  render  their  JDM  behavior
inconsistent (McGlone et al., 2005; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Yamada, 2009).
This alienation may occur due to a lack of vocabulary or of access to the factors
that determine these preferences. As a consequence, participants change their
preferences  to  ones  that  are  easier  to  explain.  Another  way  to  explain  this
impact of reasoning on decision making is based on the assumption that
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preferences are based on subjective experience that result from rapid,
automatic, unconscious and non-verbal processes. Reasoning, on the other
hand, relies on conscious thought, which may not access the process behind
subjective  experience,  thus  replacing  the  originally  intuitive  process  with
conscious reasoning (Baumeister et al., 2011). Many authors, in fact, suggest
that this is something that conscious thought should normally do, namely re-
evaluate the intuitive responses, and correct them when needed with a
normative response (Kahneman, 2003; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). This
additional reflection can lead individuals to reject the initial preference and
replace it with an alternative which has a socially sound explanation (Tilmann
Betsch,  2011;  Simonson & Nowlis,  2000).  This is  generally  how culture and
social environment affect our judgments and decisions (Baumeister &
Masicampo, 2010; Briley et al., 2010). In addition to socially accountable
situations, conscious reasoning is usually activated by conflicts (Shafir et al.,
1993), or novel situations (Verplanken et al., 1997), when automatic processes
fail to provide an unambiguous action plan.
Recently, some authors have claimed that people should not always reject
their intuitive impressions. Experts, for example, can have sophisticated
intuitions which rely on the identification of the situation and the activation of
the solution that is related to that specific situation (Lipshitz et al., 2001).
Conscious reasoning is also assumed to suffer from the capacity limitations of
the working memory and serial processing, which can lead to a maladaptive
weighting of the attributes (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Levine et al.,
1996) or generally simpler strategies (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). Levine,
Halberstadt and Goldstone (1996) suggest that conscious reasoning leads to
the impaired weighting of attributes because only a subset of attributes can be
taken into account due to the limitations of conscious thinking. This leads to
inconsistent weighting, or a dilution effect (Nisbett, Ukier, & Lemley, 1981),
where the more important attributes are given too little weight, and the less
important attributes too much weight.
The  above  accounts,  however,  concern  situations  where  all  relevant
information about the decision is immediately available:  intuitive thought is
unable to seek information that is missing from the perception of an initial
stimulus that evokes the intuitive response (Hogarth, 2005; Kahneman,
2003). As mentioned previously, information integration in decision making
can occur automatically; an information search may sometimes require
effortful search (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a).
This voluntary acquisition of information ensures that all the relevant
information has been presented in the phenomenal consciousness so it can be
integrated into otherwise automatic decision processes. Conscious thinking is
therefore required to ensure that all relevant aspects of decision have been
considered and the quality and quantity of the information is adequate to come
to a conclusion (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). If evidence does not yet warrant a
decision, the individual can seek additional information. The folk
psychological idea of conscious deliberation probably refers to this aspect of
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becoming aware of all the relevant aspects of a decision, not to the voluntary
strategies of finding the best alternative.
There are also instances where subjective experience does not provide a
clear answer to the question of which of the alternatives is the best. In novel
settings (Aarts, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg, 1998) or in conflict situations
(Shafir et al., 1993), people may resort to conscious thinking to solve a decision
problem. In these cases, an individual must first determine which attribute is
preferable before preference among alternatives can be determined. In other
words, the individual’s attention is focused on details (attributes) instead of
wholes (alternatives). This appears to be an automatic reaction in situations
where fluent processing is  somehow hindered (Alter  et  al.,  2007;  Botvinick,
2007).  The  focus  on  details  probably  helps  one  to  bring  more  relevant
information into consciousness, so that a certain conclusion can be reached. It
has  been  suggested  that  the  function  of  consciousness  is  to  present
information about these kinds of conflicts in particular (Morsella et al., 2016).
Subsequently, people should be able to introspect reliably these kinds of goal
conflicts (Berger, Dennehy, Bargh, & Morsella, 2016).
An example of an easy, non-conflicting decision.
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Consider Figure 3, which contains two images of different image quality.
The preference in this case is rather easy to obtain, as this case does not require
tradeoffs  between  alternatives,  and  we  can  make  this  decision  quite
automatically; we ‘see’ instantly that one image is better than the other.
However, if we are required to make a choice between images in Figure 4, the
task is much more difficult, as it requires a trade-off between a noisy and a
blurry image. In this case, some conscious deliberation is needed to come up
with  a  resolution  by  focusing  on  the  attributes.  This  kind  of  decision  is
somewhat uncomfortable, as it involves conflict between two attributes and
therefore requires effortful resolution.
Conflicts can also inform an individual that the task is somewhat novel. If
one is repeatedly required to make these kinds of decisions, the process will
become more automatic, and the accompanying conflict will be reduced, as the
individual learns the subjective importance of the attributes and learns to
weight them accordingly (Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999). This development is
manifested in more stable preferences. The more experience people have with
different attributes in a certain context, the more expertise they acquire within
that context (Hoeffler et al., 2013). As the effort in these novel tasks has been
associated with better learning results, it appears plausible that effortful
conscious thinking could benefit learning in these tasks. Also, if conscious
reasoning is required in these kinds of novel tasks, individuals should be able
to verbalize the reasons for their choices, at least if they have the vocabulary to
do so.
To conclude, explaining in JDM tasks appears to interfere in tasks where
subjective  experience  is  difficult  to  describe,  one  is  unable  to  access  the
reasons for one’s preferences, or the preference is formed automatically. How
far can these laboratory findings be generalized? Is it possible to avoid these
unwanted effects by asking participants to concentrate on their experiences
instead of justifying their decisions and hence reducing the social pressure?
There is also much evidence from tasks which benefit from the use of conscious
cognition (Fox et al., 2011; Hamilton, Hong, & Chernev, 2007; Hammond et
al., 1987; McMackin & Slovic, 2000; Sieck & Yates, 1997). Common to these
tasks is the analytic approach where separate pieces of information are either
sought or analyzed, the novel or unusual nature of the task, or where effortful
information search is required.
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An example of conflicting decision. An individual required to make a trade-off
between blur and noise must determine the subjective importance of blur and noise
before making a decision.
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2 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
The principal purpose of this dissertation is to respond to three claims that
have often made in academic psychology about the possibility of using
subjective explanations as data in the study of preferences. These claims
concern 1) conscious accessibility to the JDM processes, 2) fabrication when
research participants are asked to explain their judgments and decisions, and
3) the possibility that explaining would interfere with JDM processes. The
assumption behind this dissertation is that not all explanations are alike:
justification of choices and judgments may indeed in some cases mean
detachment from one’s authentic subjective experiences. This may lead to
fabrication and to distraction from the original judgment process. This
however appears to be a very context-dependent issue. There is some evidence
that focusing on subjective experiences can prevent these unwanted effects of
explanations, and explaining in some cases may even deepen the experience
and focus attention on the most relevant things, therefore benefiting the
judgments.
The first claim suggests that people rely on similar causal theories when
they explain their own judgments and the judgments of others (Dennett, 1991;
Gazzaniga, 1989; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). This suggests that their
explanations should not produce any new information. Study I aimed to test
specifically whether a method relying on subjective explanations such as the
IBQ method can produce and useful information. Similarly, Study I aimed to
test the possibility of fabrication (claim 2), by analyzing the relations between
judgments, descriptions of experience and objective stimuli. If the link
between subjective attributes and quality ratings or images is missing, then it
should be the first sign of significant problems with the IBQ approach.
Otherwise, if we find the link, it means that the explanations provide at least a
good understanding about the reasons that determine the quality ratings and
thus useful information for image quality engineers.
Study II aimed to test whether explaining interferes with judgment and
decision making in a visual, high image quality context (Claim 3). In this study
quality judgments that were explained were compared with judgment without
explanations. A popular hypothesis suggests that increased deliberation would
diminish the preference differences between alternatives (dilution effect;
Nisbett et al., 1981) as the attention is directed towards the less important
attributes (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). If explaining one’s choices does not have
an effect on judgments and decisions, it can diminish the doubt that self-
reports on the reasons for choices would somehow interfere with JDM
processes. If the participant’s performance, contrary to earlier findings,
benefits from explaining, it suggests that the IBQ method would be
particularly useful in tasks where differences are small, as in high image
quality.
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Study  III  examined  the  relevance  of  reason  fabrication  (Claim  2),  when
participants are asked to explain their choices in an image quality evaluation
task. In Study I, fabrication is studied by analyzing the association between the
alternatives and subjective attributes. In Study III, the coherency of the
explanations in relation to the objective parameters of the alternatives is
compared with quantitative measures that describe the quality of the decision-
making process. If participants fabricate their explanations, there should be
no link between the explanations and the choices.
The  purpose  of  Study  IV  was  to  clarify  the  role  of  conscious  thinking  in
learning. It tested the possibility that the facilitative effect of explaining in the
image quality task would be a result of the processing shift towards more
conscious thinking, which would benefit novel tasks in particular. This study
analyzed the effect of reasoning on learning in decision-making tasks involving
image quality evaluation. As the effect of explaining has been attributed to its
maladaptive influence on attribute weighting and preference stability, this
study specifically concentrated on these issues.
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3 METHODS
3.1 PARTICIPANTS
Participants in all studies were university students, recruited from university
e-mail lists, with a few exceptions. Due to the demographics of the university
student population, participants were mostly young adults and the number of
females was larger (Table 1). Participants reported having normal vision; in
Studies I and IV their vision was also tested.
Table 1. Participants in different studies.
Study Participants Males
Study I Experiment 1 30 6
Experiment 2 31 9
Studies II-III 59 8
Study IV Experiment 1 103 23
Experiment 2 63 8
Experiment 3 63 15
Total 349
3.2 STIMULI
In all studies, stimuli consisted of natural image contents (photographs) that
were processed, resulting in a set of images with varying image quality. Only
images with the same content were compared against each other. In Study I,
the stimulus photographs were printed (size 10 cm * 13 cm). In Studies II-IV,
stimulus images were presented on color-calibrated 24.1 inch Eizo ColorEdge
CG241W displays. The resolution of the images was 1920 * 1200 pixels.
3.2.1 STIMULI IN STUDY I
In Study I, the stimuli were created by processing photographic contents in
image signal processors (ISP), which produce the final digital photograph
from the RAW format image that is created by the camera sensor. In addition
to creating the final image from the pixels representing different colors (blue,
green and red), the purpose of the ISP is to optimize image quality by applying,
for example, noise reduction, sharpening, color, and lightness adjustments in
the raw image data (Peltoketo, 2016). Seventeen image contents were used in
two  experiments.  Six  ISPs  were  used  in  Experiment  1  and  eight  ISPs  in
Experiment 2.
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3.2.2 STIMULI IN STUDIES II-IV
In Studies II-IV, the images were generated by manipulating four quality
parameters: Blur, noise, color and lightness. The selection of these parameters
was based on the data from Study I and other similar studies; they represent
the most important dimensions of image quality in this context, when
importance is defined as the frequency with which the attribute is mentioned
In Studies II and III, three image contents (Town, Children, Party) were
used.  The  quality  of  images  was  manipulated  factorially  by  adding  blur  or
noise, or by changing the white point or luminance level of the image. White
point manipulation changes the color temperature of the image, so it becomes
either more reddish or blueish. When there were four manipulations, the
number of samples for each content was 2 * 2 * 2 * 2 = 16. In Study IV, only
Town  and  Party  contents  were  used.  Also  the  samples  where  three  or  four
attributes  were  manipulated  were  left  out,  so  that  only  11  samples  for  both
contents were used in the study.
Examples of image processing in Studies II-IV. The image at top left has changes in
color temperature; the top right image has added noise; the bottom left image is
blurred and the bottom right image has increased luminance.
3.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In all studies, participants were asked to evaluate image quality. In Study I,
image quality estimation was made by first ranking and then rating the images
according to their quality. In Studies II-IV the evaluation was made using the
paired comparison method. In order to investigate experimentally the effect of
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explaining on decisions, we compared blocks requiring explanations with
blocks  that  did  not  require  explanations.  Each  block  consisted  of  a  large
number of pair-wise choice trials, where the participant was asked to make a
decision between two images with small quality differences.
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS
3.4.1 QUANTIFICATION OF CHOICE BEHAVIOR
In paired comparison trials (Studies II-IV), distribution of choices is analyzed
as logits, which are based on the choice probabilities of alternatives (formula
1, where p and 1-p represent the choice probabilities of two alternatives in a
pair).
(1) logit (p) = ln [ p / ( 1 – p ) ]
Logit transform linearizes the probability values. The sums of logits are used
for comparing the preference differences between conditions in Study II, the
reliability of participants in Studies II and IV and the weighting of the
attributes in Study IV.
The number of intransitive choices are counted to measure participants’
preference stability in Studies III-IV. Intransitive choices are patterns A ظ B,
B ظ C,  C ظ A,  where  A,  B  and  C  are  different  alternatives  and ظ indicates
preference in paired choice trials. To normalize the data, logarithm
transformation is applied to the number of intransitive choices.
3.4.2 ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATIONS
3.4.2.1 Qualitative analysis in Study I
The grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) was applied in the
analysis of the JDM attributes. This qualitative analysis method is based on
the idea that theory should be formed on the basis of empirical, qualitative
data, and on the researcher’s conceptualization of the data that emerges
gradually during the analysis, when the researcher acquires understanding
about the relations between the concepts in the data. Grounded theory played
a larger role when the IBQ methodology was created (e.g. Eklund, 2001;
Raitisto, 2001; Salonen, 2001). The coding scheme used in Study I was a
somewhat reduced and simplified form of grounded theory. It was only used
for finding the relevant concepts that the participants used, so it lacked the
theory building part of the original approach.
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The first phase of this approach was based on open coding,  where  the
researcher goes through the text material and the explanations for ratings by
gathering themes that appear relevant. These themes are marked with codes,
such as “sharp,” “soft,” “artistic” or “grainy.” The text material consists of free
descriptions, consisting mostly of lists of attributes, but also short sentences.
Atlas.ti software (Muhr, 2004) was used for coding. Following the grounded
theory philosophy, the themes emerged from the text, not from existing theory
(hence ‘grounded theory’, as the theory in this case is grounded on data).
In the second phase, the codes created in the first phase are merged into
concepts. Participants can use different words to describe similar experiences:
for  example,  they  can  use  words  like  “fuzzy”,  “unsharp”  or  “blurry”  for  the
same experience of lacking sharpness. As the purpose of the experiment is not
to study words but the participants’ actual experiences, the codes that appear
to describe the same experience are merged into the same concept. This phase
is based on the researchers’ subjective interpretation of the meanings behind
the participants’ explanations. Therefore some kind of inter-coder reliability
check should be conducted to ensure that people share a similar
understanding about the concepts in a certain context. In the case of image
quality, the majority of the concepts appear to have excellent or good inter-
coder reliability (Radun et al., 2008).
3.4.2.2 Quantitative analysis in Study III
Contrary to the qualitative analysis of Study I, the second phase of the
qualitative analysis was not done in Study III; the coding of the explanation
data in this study was done without making any interpretations about the
meanings of the attributes, so only obvious synonyms (e.g. “not sharp” and
“unsharp”) were merged into the same code. For example, attributes such as
blurry and unsharp were kept separate in order to respect the personal use of
attributes  individuals  use  and  to  diminish  the  researcher’s  influence  on  the
interpretation of the data.
For each attribute, objective counterpart(s) were sought by examining the
co-occurrences between attributes and objective differences between the
stimuli. This was done participant-wise. The objective parameter(s) with the
highest probability of co-occurrence with a certain attribute were selected as a
corresponding objective counterpart. Further analyses were made with these
subjective attribute – objective parameter pairs.
Two measures were developed to describe the participants’ correspondence
between explanations and objective differences: consistency and
predictability. Consistency referred to the probability that the participant uses
the attributes with the corresponding objective parameters. The predictability,
on the other hand, is the Bayesian probability of a certain attribute being
present in participants’ explanations with a certain configuration of objective
parameters:
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(2) P (subj | obj) = [P (obj | subj) * P (subj)] / P (obj)
Where P (subj | obj) is the predictability value for each attribute, P (obj | subj)
is the probability of certain objective parameters when a corresponding
subjective attribute is mentioned (that is, consistency), P (subj) is the
probability of an attribute and P (obj) is the probability of the objective
parameter.
The final values used for describing the participants’ performance in the
task were derived from weighted mean predictability and consistency values
averaged over all attributes. The weight was determined by the attribute’s
frequency.
54
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
4.1 STUDY I: SUBJECTIVE QUALITY EXPERIENCE OF
IMAGES PROCESSED WITH DIFFERENT IMAGE
SIGNAL PROCESSORS
4.1.1 PROCEDURE
After vision tests, participants were asked to rank the images according to their
quality. Ranking was done by categorizing images into 11 classes, representing
the numbers from 0 to 10: all the samples of each image content were given to
the participant, who was first asked to choose the lowest quality and highest
quality sample in that content. Number 0 represented the lowest quality
sample in the set and 10 the best sample. After this, the rest of the samples
were divided into categories representing the numbers 0-10. Participants were
asked to use all categories, but they could also put more than one image into a
category. The order of the contents was randomized. After the ranking,
participants were asked to describe the quality aspects of each picture in their
own words.
4.1.2 RESULTS
Attribute frequencies suggest that color balance, sharpness, luminance level,
graininess and naturalness are the most important aspects of image quality in
this context, in this order (Figure 6).
In order to find the dimensions of quality experience that differentiate
different ISPs from each other, correspondence analysis (CA) was performed
on the attribute-ISP cross-tabulation collected from both experiments 1 and 2.
The number of attributes in the analysis was 20 and the number of ISPs 14,
although one ISP was present twice as it was used in both experiments. The
three most explanatory dimensions were taken into further analysis. The most
important dimension, accounting for 45.8% of the variance, was the color
distortion dimension, which separated the images with natural images from
images which had shifted colors (Figure 7). The second most explanatory
dimension separated the grainy images from dark images, accounting for
26.1% of the variance. Finally, the third dimension, accounting for 17.7% of the
variance, separated sharp from unsharp images.
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Frequencies of different attributes in Study I.
When  information  about  the  attribute  dimensions  is  combined  with
information  about  the  average  ratings  of  the  ISPs  (Figure  8),  the  picture
becomes  clearer:  it  appears  that  the  color  shift  dimension  is  monotonically
related to quality ratings, so that images from ISPs lacking this color shift are
experienced as more natural and therefore of better quality. In the two other
dimensions, the optimal experience exists in the middle; the farther the ISP is
located from this middle point, the worse ratings it receives. When dimension
1  is  quite  directly  related  to  quality  ratings  in  all  ISPs,  dimensions  2  and  3
appear  to  differentiate  between  the  best  ISPs  and  the  ISPs  that  are  rated
between the worst and the best.
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Perceptual map provided by the correspondence analysis performed on the
attribute-ISP cross-tabulation. Dimension 1 differentiates the ISPs with good color
reproduction from ISPs with color shift. Dimension 2 differentiates ISPs producing
dark images from ISPs producing grainy images. Dimension 3 differentiates sharp
ISPs from unsharp ISPs
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Mean quality ratings for ISPs appear to be monotonically related to dimension 1.
Dimensions 2 and 3 have optimum levels that are located near the origin.
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4.1.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY I
Study I suggests that participants’ free verbal descriptions provide rich
qualitative data why certain ISPs fail to produce good-quality images. By
enhancing color reproduction (dimension 1), much improvement could be
done in image quality. After this, engineers should optimize the balance
between graininess and darkness (dimension 2): when images are shot in low
lighting conditions, the signal-to-noise ratio tends to be low and the
amplification of the signal may decrease darkness but increase noise (that is,
graininess). The resulting noise, on the other hand, can be reduced by slightly
averaging the pixels in the image (dimension 3); the resulting blur, however,
can reduce the quality more than it  is  increased by reducing the amount of
noise.
The purpose of the CA in this case is not to provide a picture of the general
image quality dimensions that participants experience. Instead, it describes
the dimensions of experience that differentiate between ISPs in this set of ISPs
and contents. “Sharp” and “grainy,” for example, are in this case located quite
near to each other in the perceptual map provided by the CA, which means
that ISPs that produce sharp images in certain contents produce noisy images
in others, due to the noise reduction technique described. A similar
optimization problem also exists with the luminance level and noise. ISP is a
system in which one parameter affects other parameters, often with
unexpected results.
The results therefore illustrate the important applied decision problem,
which is the question of multidimensional optimization. This means that the
best choice requires trade-offs between attributes. The purpose of Study I was
to show that free descriptions provide data that is consistently related both to
the judgments and the objective properties of the judged objects in a context
that  is  multidimensional  and  systemic.  As  previously  shown  (Leisti  et  al.,
2009; Radun et al., 2008), consumers appear to share a common vocabulary
about image quality, which they use when describing differences among
images. This vocabulary relates to a low-dimensional conceptual space that
describes the differences between the subjective experiences concerning image
quality and the stimuli being evaluated.
Although the IBQ method is not specifically designed to provide
information about judgment strategies, the results of the CA suggest that
people  appear  to  use  less  criteria  when  the  quality  is  low,  but  when  it  gets
better more criteria are taken into account. The attribute named “color shift”
stands alone in the dimension differentiating between good and bad ISPs,
which suggests that the worst quality images are mostly experienced as having
distorted colors. To some degree, this also applies to the attributes “dark” and
“grainy.” This can be interpreted so that when certain weakness in the image
is salient, the image is immediately experienced as weak in terms of quality
and it will not be further examined. The decision is easily made, when single
diagnostic criterion is instantly accessible, supporting a simple intuitive
approach to the decision. However, when the quality gets better, the
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participants take more attributes into consideration. In these cases, conscious
thought may be activated to find out solutions for the tradeoffs between
attributes.
4.2 STUDY II: EFFECT OF EXPLAINING ON
INFORMATION USE IN VISUAL DECISION MAKING
Study I analyzed the correspondence between the free verbal description of
quality experience between products and judgments. In Study II, we examined
how explaining affected the strength of preferences across all participants, and
participants’ reliability of choices in our task. For the purposes of this study,
we developed an experimental methodology to study high quality image
quality where multiattribute JDM would be relevant. Therefore we designed a
pair-wise choice task, with alternatives with separable, non-salient, easily
verbalized visual attributes. Separability means that visual dimensions can be
seen  separately,  unlike,  for  example,  the  dimensions  of  color  (Garner  &
Felfoldy,  1970):  the  mix  of  green  and  red  appears  as  yellow;  one  cannot
separate this mix as green and yellow. Non-salient attributes are attributes
that are not instantly seen at  the stimulus,  but they require some voluntary
search to be detected. The assumption of easy verbalization relies on our
previous studies, where sharpness, graininess, lightness and color were among
the most frequent attributes mentioned by the research participants (Leisti,
Radun, Virtanen, Halonen, & Nyman, 2009; Radun et al., 2010).
Our experiment consisted of 3 blocks with 120 trials. The middle block was
done with explanations, and the 2 other blocks were silent control blocks. The
preference difference was defined by first calculating the choice probabilities
of alternatives in all pairs across participants and transforming these
probabilities into logits. The mean preference differences of the pairs were
then compared between the conditions using Friedman’s ANOVA. In addition
to preference polarization between alternatives, this measure also reflects the
degree of consensus about which of the pairs is better.
Participants’ reliability in this experiment was defined as how often the
participant chose the same alternative when the differences were the same:
four different manipulations existed (blur, noise, lightness, color), and for
each manipulation there were eight image pairs where the only difference was
in the manipulation in question. The logit values of the choice probabilities
from these pairs were summed for each participant and condition as a measure
of reliability in each condition.
4.2.1 PROCEDURE
Participants were asked to evaluate image quality in paired comparison setting
in conditions that either required explanations for choices or did not. One
participant  completed  three  blocks:  the  first  was  silent  (i.e.  did  not  require
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explanations), the second required explanations and the third was again silent.
In each block, participants made 120 paired, forced choices between different
versions of the same image content. In other words, participants went through
all the pair combinations of sixteen samples of each content in random order.
Contents for different blocks were randomized and counter-balanced between
participants.
4.2.2 RESULTS
Explaining polarized the preference differences between the alternatives
(Friedman’s ANOVA: ǒ2(2) = 72.117, p < .001): the differences between pairs
were larger (M = 1.11; SD = 1.22) in conditions requiring explanations than in
both the first silent (M = .56 ; SD = .86; Z = í 10.62, p < .001), and the second
silent block (M = .57; SD = .74; Z = 11.22, p < .001). No difference was found
between two silent conditions (Z = í .571; p < .58).
The experimental condition had a significant effect on the participants’
reliability  as  well  (F(2,  106)  =  22.89;  p  <  .001;  Figure  9):  they  were  more
reliable in their choices when they were asked to explain their choices than in
two silent  conditions  (F(1,  53)  =  25.28;  p  <  .001;  and  F(1,  53)  =  38.16;  p  <
.001).
Reliability in different blocks.
In addition to reliability, the reason for this beneficial effect of explaining
was sought from the participants’ choice behavior. We examined how much
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their decisions resembled choices based on the logistic regression model,
which would in this case represent the compensatory weight additive (WADD)
strategy, and would take all available information into account. The similarity
with  the  logistic  model  was  calculated  from  the  area  under  the  ROC  curve
(AOR). We found that condition, again, had significant effect on AORs (F(2,
106) = 1.45;  p < .001.).  The explanation condition differed from both silent
conditions (t(58) = 3.13; p = .003; and t(58) = 4.26; p < .001). This suggests
that more information was taken into account when determining the choices
in the condition that required participants to explain their choices. This
appears to be related to better reliability (r = .58; p < .001; Figure 10).
Area under the ROC curve plotted as a function of reliability.
4.2.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY II
It  has  been  suggested  that  judgments  and  decisions  that  are  based  on
perceptual experiences are prone to  interference of verbalization (McGlone et
al., 2005; Wilson et al., 1993; Yamada, 2009), either due to lack of vocabulary,
or  due  to  a  processing  change  from  a  more  automatic  to  a  more  conscious
mode. That explaining facilitated choices in this perceptual JDM task in this
study contradicts these assumptions and suggests that explaining has a
beneficial  effect  on  the  evaluation  of  high  quality  images.  This  was  a  novel
result, and also an unexpected finding as the consensus about the distracting
effect  of  verbalization  in  perceptual  JDM  tasks  has  been  so  strong,
independent of the school of thought (Chin & Schooler, 2008; Ericsson &
Simon, 1980; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).
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Study II showed that conscious thought processes and perceptual processes
function in interaction with each other and that explaining appears to facilitate
information acquisition: participants were both more reliable and used
strategies that relied on more comprehensive information use than when they
were not required to explain their choices. The results support the idea that
conscious thought benefits information acquisition in particular, as well as the
assumption that accountability requires participants to use more effort in
considering more information in their decisions.
4.3 STUDY III: QUALITY OF EXPLANATIONS AND
STABILITY OF PREFERENCE
In  Study  III,  we  wanted  to  examine  the  contents  of  the  explanations
quantitatively to understand how they are related to the participants’ behavior.
The target of investigation was the association between the participants’
preference stability and the predictability of the explanations. A strong
association between these measures suggests that they reflect a common
underlying thought process, which determines the participants’ decisions.
This would inform about the possibility of fabrication in similar tasks. In
addition to this general tendency, we wanted to understand individual
differences in the response to the requirement to explain one’s decisions. The
hypothesis was that participants who have problems approaching the task by
means of conscious thought should perform better in the silent condition,
whereas participants who can successfully perform conscious thinking in the
task should benefit from explaining. This would explain the results about the
different effect of explaining in different tasks.
We examined the participants’ preference stability by calculating the
number of intransitive choices. In the simplest case, intransitivity occurs with
three alternatives A, B and C, when A is preferred over B, B is preferred over
C,  and  C  is  preferred  over  A.  The  explanations  were  quantified  by  using
measures for predictability and consistency. Predictability is the Bayesian
probability that an explanation can be predicted from the objective differences
between alternatives. Consistency, on the other hand, is the proportion of the
explanations presented consistently with a corresponding objective difference.
4.3.1 DATA
Explanation and choice data from Study II was re-analyzed in this study.
4.3.2 RESULTS OF STUDY III
The  condition  had  significant  effect  on  the  log-transformed  number  of
intransitive choices (F(2, 106) = 1.45; p < .001. ǆ2 = .17). The requirement to
explain choices decreased intransitivity in comparison with the first silent
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(t(58) = 3.62; p = .001; d = .29), and last silent block (t(58) = 4.03; p = .001.;
d = .44). In this case, reasoning appears to make the participants’ preferences
more stable, which is contrary to several studies on the subject and is in line
with  the  results  of  Study  II  concerning  the  more  comprehensive  use  of
information when the decisions were asked to be explained.
The  reason  for  this  change  in  performance  was  sought  from  the
explanations of the participants. When we examined the relation between the
quantitative measures describing the explanations and preference stability, we
found that predictability of explanations is negatively associated with
intransitivity, but only in the condition which required explaining (B = -2.46;
p < .001; R2 = .34); in silent conditions, the participants’ predictability was not
related  to  their  performance  (first  block:  B  =  .20;  p>  .05;  R2 =  .09  second
block: B = .09; p> .05; R2 = .04). This supports the assumption that explaining
causes a shift in processing from an intuitive to a more conscious mode.
On an individual level, the ability to create predictable explanations
appears  to  explain  the  change  in  the  number  of  intransitive  choices  from a
silent condition to a condition requiring explanations (B = -2.65; p < .001; R2
= .19; Figure 11) and vice versa (B = 2.55; p < .01; R2 = .20). In other words, if
individuals create good explanations, they will benefit from explaining,
whereas  the  situation  is  the  opposite  with  those  who  cannot  create  good
explanations.
Concerning the role of consistency, we found that it was associated with the
reliability of the choices (B = 8.59; p < .001; R2 = .24), but not with the number
of  intransitive  choices.  This  only  applied  to  the  explanation  conditions;  the
association was non-significant in the silent conditions.
Difference in the log-transformed number of intransitive choices plotted against the
predictability of the explanations.
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4.3.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY III
Study III indicates a clear link between conscious thoughts and the
participants’ performance. The more coherent explanations the participant
can create, the more coherent is the participant’s behavior, suggesting that
explanations for choices reflect the underlying process that also determines
the participant’s choices. However, conclusions cannot be made about the
participants’ performance in the silent condition in the explanations: the
participants’ response to the requirement to explain their choices appears to
be dependent on personal and context factors. These factors determine
whether the individual benefits from conscious thought in these cases or
whether conscious thinking has a distracting effect on the judgment processes.
The participants that could create more predictable explanations could
improve their stability in the second block of the experiment.
We assumed that the participants’ reliability would be related to enhanced
carefulness as well  as  to the consistency of  the explanations.  We found that
consistency indeed is related to better reliability, but not to more stable
preferences. This dissociation suggests that stability of preferences in this case
results from the processing shift, not from carefulness in information
acquisition.
4.4 STUDY IV: THE EFFECT OF EXPLAINING ON
LEARNING IN VISUAL DECISION MAKING
In our earlier experiments, we controlled the effect of learning by placing it
between the silent blocks. This experimental setting, however, does not take
into account that, at the end of the experiment, fatigue may cancel the effect
of  learning.  The  better  performance  in  the  middle  explaining  block  may
therefore  be  caused  by  learning,  not  by  explaining,  and  this  learning  effect
could then be cancelled by fatigue in the last, third block. We therefore made
three further experiments to examine this possible learning effect. In this
study, we also wanted to generally examine the change of weights and
preference stability over several minor decisions, both when decisions are
explained and when they are not explained. This should increase
understanding about the role of conscious thought in learning in JDM tasks.
Preference stability  results  from learning,  but it  is  also influenced by the
requirement to justify one’s preferences. Additionally, attribute weights are
affected by these factors, too, and it is not known whether these effects interact
with each other. We measured both preference stability and the weights both
between blocks, where different image contents were evaluated, and within
blocks, where the target of evaluation stayed the same. All experiments had 55
trials in two blocks. To examine the effect of learning within each block, we
divided each block into five phases with 11 trials. The explanation block was
randomly  either  in  the  first  or  in  the  second  block  of  the  first  experiment.
Experiment  2A  required  explaining  in  both  blocks  and  Experiment  2B  was
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completely silent. Preference stability was measured by calculating the
number  of  intransitive  choices  in  paired  comparisons.  The  weights  of  the
attributes were estimated by calculating the probability of how often the
participants chose the alternative with a certain attribute.
4.4.1 EXPERIMENT 1
4.4.1.1 Procedure
Each experiment in this study contained two blocks, with different image
content, which were randomized and counter-balanced between participants.
In each block, participants made 55 paired choices, consisting of all pair
combinations of 11 stimuli. In Experiment 1, one block was silent and the other
required explanations. The order of these conditions was varied between two
experimental groups. In Experiment 2, participants explained their choices in
both blocks. Experiment 3 was similar to Experiment 2, except that both
blocks were silent
4.4.1.2 Experiment 1: Results
Only the interaction between the condition (explanations vs. silent) and the
order of the conditions was significant (F(1, 92) = 7.97; p = .006; partial ᐭ2 =
.08). Therefore both explanations and learning improved the participants’
preference stability. When explanations were required in the first block, the
effects of learning and explanations neutralized each other, as the first block
benefitted from explaining and the second block from learning (F(1, 46) = .50;
p = .483). In the group in which the explanations were required in the second
block, the participants benefitted from both learning and explaining (F(1, 46)
= 12.02; p = .001; partial ᐭ2 = .21). Learning was then examined by dividing
each block into five phases. The number of intransitive choices was found to
decrease by phases (F(4, 96) = 8.73; p < .001; partial ᐭ2 =  .28).  The
participants’ preference stability thus improved when they learned to execute
the task.
This increasing stability was accompanied by increasing attribute weights
(F(4, 368) = 2.75; p =.03; partial ᐭ2 = .03) and, to be more precise, only the
weight of the most important attribute (F(4, 368) = 11.89; p < .001; partial ᐭ2
= .25). Therefore it seems that preferences stabilize when participants become
more certain about the importance of the attributes. Mediation analysis,
however, did not give definite support for this assumption.
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4.4.2 EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B
Experiments 2A and 2B aimed to isolate the effect of learning from explaining.
Therefore participants in Experiment 2A explained their choices in both
blocks, and in Experiment 2B both blocks were silent.
4.4.2.1 Experiment 2A: Results
Learning significantly decreased the number of intransitive choices when
compared between the blocks (block 1: M = 2.70, SD = .76; block 2: M = 2.34,
SD  =  .90;  F(1,  60)  =  6.71;  p  =  .012;  partial ᐭ2 =  .10).  This  was,  again,
accompanied by increasing attribute weights (F(1, 58) = 8.69; p = .005; partial
ᐭ2 = .13. This time, mediation analysis also confirmed that more consistent
choices follow from more coherent attribute weighting: the difference of the
most important attribute between blocks was significant (t(61) = -2.298; p =
.025, and in the regression model (R2 = .62) it predicted the log-transformed
number of intransitive choices (B = - .57; t(61) = -9.68; p < .001). Within the
blocks,  the  number  of  intransitive  choices  decreased  (F(4,  240)  =  7.35;  p  <
.001; partial ᐭ2 = .11) and the attribute weights increased (F(4, 232) = 6.013; p
< .001; partial ᐭ2 = .09; figure 7a).
4.4.2.2 Experiment 2B: Results
Experiment 2B was similar to Experiment 2, except that both blocks were
silent.  In  this  experiment,  the  block  did  not  influence  the  number  of
intransitive choices (F(1, 61) = 2.62; p = .11; first block: M = 2.72, SD = .82;
second block: M = 2.51, SD = .80). In other words, we did not find a significant
effect for learning. This also applied to the weights of the attributes across the
blocks. Even when blocks are divided into five phases, no significant learning
was found within blocks, when measured as the log-transformed number of
intransitive  choices  (F(4,  244)  =  2.21;  p  =  .073).  This  also  applied  to  the
attribute weights in general (F(4, 240) = .41; p = .80). However, the phase and
the importance interacted (F(12, 732) = 2.78; p = .001; partial ᐭ2 = .04; Figure
7b). This was due to the increasing weight of the most important attribute (F(4,
244) = 6.67; p < .001; partial ᐭ2 = .10) and the decreasing weight of the second
most important attribute (F(4, 244) = 2.68; p = .032; partial ᐭ2 = .04). So,
learning influenced the weights of the attributes but in different directions.
Therefore, learning did not increase the choice consistency in the silent version
of Experiment 2B, as it did in Experiment 2A that required explanations.
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Development of the attribute weights according to their subjective importance in
phases 1-5 of the experiment. Solid lines indicate the first block and dashed lines
the second block of the experiment. Reprinted from Leisti & Häkkinen (2018).
4.4.3 CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY IV
We found that  better  preference  stability  in  the  second block  of  our  quality
estimation task is indeed a consequence of learning. However, when the effect
of learning is removed from the participants’ performance, explaining still has
a facilitating influence on participants’ preference stability.
Additional analyses and experiments showed that, contrary to our earlier
assumptions, facilitated preference stability occurred in the latter parts of the
experiment,  not  in  the  early  part,  when  the  task  was  still  novel  to  the
participants. When participants started the experiment, they were probably
using a rather conscious strategy, independent of whether they were asked to
provide  reasons  for  their  choices.  When  the  experiment  continued,  the
participants who were not required to justify their decisions started to ignore
less important attributes, whose weight started to decline. As a consequence,
participants were unable to improve their preference stability. Participants
who explained their choices through the experiments could improve their
preference stability by increasing the overall weights of the attributes.
The results of Study IV suggest that conscious thinking appears to enhance
the consistency of individuals in a larger time frame. Many previous findings
about the influence of conscious reasoning on judgments have suggested that
it may decrease the consistency of the participants, but these studies have used
tasks that can be done rather automatically. Even more importantly, they have
concerned only individual decisions, performed in isolation. The findings of
Study  IV  suggest  that  explaining  in  a  relatively  novel  task  may  improve
learning and therefore enhance participants’ consistency in the long run. Thus,
following the assumptions presented in the introductory section,  the role of
conscious thought is to create temporal continuity in an individual’s behavior
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and solve conflicts that emerge when there is no existing solution to JDM
problems. The role of conscious thought is not to solve familiar decisions,
because automatisms and routines exist for that purpose. Rather it can help to
find and utilize additional information when the decision is somewhat
unfamiliar or conflicting.
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5 DISCUSSION
5.1 REVIEW OF THE KEY FINDINGS
The purpose of the four studies presented in this dissertation was to examine
how explaining one’s judgments and decisions affects JDM processes in the
visual quality evaluation context, and how valid and useful data explanations
can be provided to researchers. This research had therefore both applied and
basic research motives: from the basic research perspective, examination of
subjective explanations can clarify the role of self-reflection and awareness in
JDM processes, as well as the social aspect of making one’s decisions
understandable to others. The applied perspective, on the other hand, aims to
examine the usefulness and validity of the IBQ method in high image quality
estimation.
The present studies were designed to respond to the three claims that are
usually presented against the use of subjective explanations for judgments and
decisions. These claims are, in a very simplified form: 1) people do not have
conscious access to their JDM processes; 2) explanations about judgments and
decisions are fabrications, not descriptions of real JDM processes; and 3)
explaining one’s judgments distracts these processes. In contrast, our
assumption was that subjective explanations reflect the decision space for
voluntary actions, and that people’s deficient self-understanding relates to
situations where perceptually oriented subjective experience and socially
oriented conscious thought are in conflict and the participants have difficulties
in providing socially credible explanations for their preferences. In these cases,
people can detach themselves from their original experiences, which may end
up in unwanted consequences, such as fabrication and interference with the
JDM process. When subjective experience and conscious thought work in
concert, however, the description of experience may even enrich and deepen
the subjective experience, thus increasing the available information for
judgments. This reflection can also increase self-understanding and coherence
in judgments and decisions in the long run, ultimately leading to better
learning.
The influential theory of stock-pile explanations (Claim 1; Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977) suggests that people explain their judgments and decisions
using the same processes they would use when explaining other people’s
judgments and decisions (Dennett, 1991; Gazzaniga, 1989; Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). From the methodological point of view, this suggests that explanations
provide no new data for the researcher, because the participants do not have
privileged and private access to their JDM processes. Instead, they are
assumed to rely on typical explanations that people use in similar cases. Study
I specifically studied this claim. We found that participants’ descriptions of
their quality experience yielded a clear dimensional structure, which is
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unambiguously associated both with quality ratings and the ISP’s that were
evaluated in the study. The dimensions provided a picture about the relations
of the relevant attributes of experience in that specific context, for example,
the tradeoffs between sharpness and graininess, or between darkness and
graininess. More importantly, the dimensions informed how quality in these
cases could be enhanced by pointing out the optimum levels with these trade-
offs. It does not appear plausible that participants would have relied on folk
theories when they produced such sophisticated explanations for their ratings.
It can be claimed that participants do not have access to the processes that
determine judgments; however, they usually have privileged access to the
subjective experience on which the judgments are based.
Although the IBQ method is not designed to probe the specific processes of
judgments and decisions, it also provided information about what the relevant
attributes are at different quality levels. Color distortion, for example, appears
to degrade quality so that participants do not even consider other image
properties in their ratings. Here, the prevailing strategy appears to be a simple
lexicographic strategy. However, when the quality gets better, the descriptions
of quality experience become richer, which probably reflects that fact that
participants in this quality level are required to make trade-offs between
different attributes, such as sharpness and graininess. The attribute space
which determines the quality rating is therefore different in different quality
levels, emphasizing the context-dependency of the JDM processes. In
comparison with other methods, the use of predefined scales would, in this
case, have masked these strategy differences in different levels of quality.
Taken together, the IBQ method, in this case, appears highly useful, as it
opens the information used in the process of quality judgment to examination,
and therefore gives a unique insight into how quality could be improved,
supporting findings reported elsewhere (Häkkinen et al., 2008; Leisti et al.,
2009; Radun et al., 2008, 2007). Evidence for fabrication (Claim 2) was non-
existent, as indicated by inconsistent use of attributes, although this was not
specifically tested in this experiment. As a conclusion, participants’
explanations for their ratings appear to be authentic descriptions of subjective
experience, which acts as an intermediate processing stage between the
objective parameters of the alternatives and the behavioral response of the
participants. Without understanding how the objective properties of the
images were interpreted within this intermediate stage it would be difficult to
explain the associations between objective properties and ratings.
The findings of Study I did not rule out the possibility that explaining one’s
ratings could distract the participant from the primary task, the quality
estimation (Claim 3). Therefore we made an additional experiment, Study II,
to find out the effect of explaining on high image quality, where differences
between images approach the perceptual threshold and judgments require
trade-offs between alternatives. This is a field of study where the IBQ method
appears to be the most useful, as Study I suggests. The findings of Study II
were quite clear: explaining the choices did not distract the participants from
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the task, on the contrary: participants were able to notice the quality
differences better when they were asked to provide reasons for their choices.
Explaining did not therefore distract from the task but benefitted it.
Participants used strategies that were more compensatory, i.e. they attended
more information in their judgments, thus making more reliable choices. The
general consequence to the primary task, quality evaluation, was clearer
differences between different samples, so no evidence existed to support the
dilution effect (Nisbett et al., 1981), according to which preference differences
are smaller between alternatives, when the choices are explained. This
contrasts  with  Wilson’s  and  Schooler’s  (1991)  results,  which  have  been
regarded as evidence for not using explaining in JDM tasks. In conclusion, the
effect of verbalization on JDM tasks should be evaluated case-wise.
Study  III  aimed  to  combine  the  findings  from  Study  I  and  II,  by
quantitatively examining the correspondence between JDM behavior and the
contents of the explanations. The purpose was to increase understanding
about the different effects that are caused by introspection on judgments and
decisions in different tasks. It further examined the reasons for the better
performance in the explained condition (Claim 3) in Study II and also access
to the JDM processes (Claim 1) and fabrication (Claim 2). The hypothesis was
that predictable explanations should be related to better preference stability.
This association suggests that the explanations reflect the underlying thought
process that should also determine the choices. The participants who are
unable to reflect their quality experience should perform worse in the tasks,
thus  having  lower  preference  stability,  whereas  the  situation  should  be  the
opposite for those who can reflect their experiences successfully. This should
be dissociated from the post hoc explanations that would instead be associated
with carefulness and other socially appropriate behavior and not with the
underlying process of judgment.
The  results  of  Study  III  show  that  a  better  understanding  of  one’s  JDM
processes and the effect of explaining are associated so that lower
understanding appears to be related to the maladaptive effects of explaining.
We found that explaining made the participants make less intransitive choices,
that  is,  they  were  more  stable  in  their  preferences.  This  effect,  however,
depended on how predictable the explanations were. Both explanations and
choices thus appear to reflect the same underlying process. The result
therefore gives no indication of fabrication.
To  understand  this  phenomenon  more  deeply,  we  took  an  idiographic
approach and analyzed what caused the changes in performance when
participants proceeded from the first silent block to the second block, which
required them to explain the choices. We found that those who were able to
create predictable explanations were also those who managed to decrease the
number of intransitive choices. This group, representing the majority of the
participants, determined the overall result of the experiment, which suggested
that explaining benefits judgments and decision in this particular task.
However, those who could not create predictable explanations performed
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worse when explanations were required. The result may explain why conscious
thought appears to have a distracting effect on certain tasks: in these tasks the
majority of the participants are probably unable to find a coherent logic for
their choices that otherwise are based on automatic responses.
Predictability was defined as the portion of attributes that could be
predicted from the objective differences between alternatives. Predictability
therefore relates to the concept of completeness (Wilson, 1994), which is
opposite to the amount of information that participants omit from the
subjective explanations of their choices. The random explanations were
associated with random choices in Study III; the omission of information in
the explanations hence appears to be related to the omission of information in
JDM processes, leading to noisy processing and less consistent choices.
The other measure, the consistency of the explanations was not related to
more stable preferences, but to better reliability (see Study II). Consistency is
the  portion  of  attributes  that  are  used  with  the  corresponding  objective
differences. A certain participant can be both consistent but not predictable
when attributes of choice are created post hoc. Predictable attributes, on the
other hand, suggest that the participant has a certain scheme that is followed
in every decision. The result suggests that the generation of reasons that are
grounded  on  objective  differences  is  not  enough;  reasons  should  be  used
coherently. These two measures may reflect different processes: predictability
may be related to the participants’ aim to choose images logically on the basis
of previous choices, whereas the consistency of explanations may reflect the
participants’ aim to find good justifications for their choices. The differences
between explaining and justification are discussed in Section 5.3. The results
suggest that there may be two mechanisms that mediate the effect of
explaining on the JDM processes.
Study  IV  was  carried  out  because  in  Study  II  the  comparisons  between
conditions were made within subjects, and the block that required explanation
was  located  in  the  second block,  and  the  silent  blocks  before  and  after  that
block. There is always a possibility that the performance in the second block is
better due to learning, and the performance in the third block worse due to
fatigue. Therefore the experimental design in Study IV was changed: the first
group of the participants first made the condition requiring explanations, and
then  the  silent  condition.  In  the  second  group  of  participants,  the  silent
condition was made first, then the explanations condition. In the former
group, no difference between blocks was found. However, in the latter group
we found a large difference in performance between conditions.
Because the difference was measured within participants, there are two
possibilities: the first possibility is that in the first group, participants learn a
better  strategy  in  the  explanation  condition,  which  is  applied  in  the  second
block – therefore, there is no difference between blocks. In the second group,
participants  do  not  learn  a  better  strategy  until  the  second  block  requiring
explanations. The second possibility is that explaining and learning have an
independent, additive effect on the preference stability. Therefore two
73
additional experiments were conducted to examine the role of learning in the
task: first with explanations and second when completely silent. The results of
these two studies suggest that explaining enhances learning and within-
participant consistency. In particular, explaining appears to increase the
weights of the less important attributes; for the most important attribute,
there seems to be no difference whether the choices are explained or not. The
result  supports  the  idea  that  explaining  can  deepen  the  experience,  thus
leading to wider decision space.
The findings of all studies support the assumption that the effect of
explaining on JDM is dependent on the task, the instructions given to the
participant, and the participants’ verbal ability to explain their decisions. More
importantly, the results emphasize understanding the mental states and
processes that are located between the presentation of the alternatives and the
choice. Subjective experience therefore does not appear to play an
epiphenomenal role in JDM processes. Additionally, the interaction between
subjective experience (often referred to as intuition) and conscious thinking
appears to be fruitful, and especially how multidimensional experiences are
processed in JDM.
5.2 THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUS THOUGHT IN JDM
BASED ON SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
5.2.1 AUTOMATIC VS. VOLUNTARY PROCESSES
In the introduction, I presented claims that are often posed towards any
method that is based on the elicitation of participants’ subjective explanations
for their choices. In the four studies presented in this dissertation, we showed
that the claims are dependent on the context and do not to apply in the high
image quality or similar evaluations. These results are not necessarily in
contradiction to these earlier, opposite results though. Instead, they provide a
more precise picture of human ability to introspect reasons for actions and the
role of conscious thought in judgments and decisions.
These issues are closely intertwined with the dichotomy between automatic
and controlled voluntary processes. Automatic processes are rapid and often
employ  parallel  information  processing  (Schneider  &  Chein,  2003)  and
therefore  they  are  noncompliant  with  the  slow  and  serial  nature  of  speech,
making the verbalization of these processes impossible or at least difficult.
Furthermore, increasing evidence suggests that judgments and decisions are
often  based  on  these  automatic  processes,  which  are  present  both  in  the
creation of subjective experience and in the processes that integrate
information to form preferences from the experience. This evidence is in line
with the evolutionary idea that all animals are required to make choices with
multiple  alternatives  and  it  seems  plausible  that  the  brain  consists  of
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mechanisms that serve the information integration needs of decisions
efficiently so that coherent behavior would be possible.
A definite human feature, deliberative conscious thought (Baumeister &
Masicampo, 2010), is expensive in terms of the allocation of limited
attentional resources; reliance on conscious thinking for judgments and
decisions therefore requires some kind of justification. Certain authors have
concluded that this kind of justification cannot be found and have therefore
denied  the  role  of  conscious  thoughts  on  behavior  altogether  (e.g.  Wegner,
2005). There are several reasons to think that this is not really the case: for
example, it appears that all experiments that have stressed the role of non-
conscious processes nevertheless use instructions given by the experimenter
and the participants are expected to voluntarily follow these instructions
(Baumeister et al., 2011; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010).
Rather,  it  is  more  plausible  that  non-conscious  and  conscious  processes
interact in the control of behavior, and their roles differ between tasks
(Baumeister et al., 2017; Williams & Poehlman, 2017). Automatic processes
may  produce  a  number  of  results  that  become  conscious  in  subjective
experience. These conscious experiences and the non-conscious information
integration processes work in continuous interaction. Let us think of wine
tasting, for instance. When we take a first mouthful of wine, we instantly make
some kind of judgment of quality, which probably has a basis in evolution: we
have to decide whether the drink is drinkable, spoiled or even poisonous. After
this,  we  may  perceive  a  number  of  other  attributes  by  shifting  our  focus  of
attention. Our initial judgment of quality is not a result of consciously
processing  the  attributes  of  taste,  it  is  automatic.  However,  by  focusing  our
attention on different aspects of the taste of wine, we can adjust our judgments
and enrich our experience of quality. Recent evidence suggests that different
attentional focus actually changes the subjective experience of taste, not how
the aspects of subjective experience are integrated into judgments (Lee et al.,
2006;  Yamada  et  al.,  2014).  On the  basis  of  our  earlier  experience  or  other
contextual factors, we can therefore focus on different aspects of the wine,
producing different quality estimations. Learning has a significant effect on
the ability  to make this  kind of  differential  evaluation (Dijkstra et  al.,  2013;
Hoeffler et al., 2013). As novices are not aware of the role of attention in the
formation of judgments, they may be more vulnerable to context effects than
experts, who are usually aware of their processes (McGlone et al., 2005;
Yamada, 2009). In this way, even the automatic processes that are involved in
the creation of our experiences can be under voluntary control.
Instead of direct access, consciousness appears to have this kind of indirect
introspective  access  to  the  JDM  processes,  which  is  based  on  learning  in
similar  tasks  (Jack  &  Shallice,  2001).  While  making  different  kinds  of
decisions, an individual can gradually learn which aspects of subjective
experience co-occur with preferences. This is supported by the findings
indicating that understanding one’s own preferences develops when
experience is gathered (Dijkstra et al., 2013; McGlone et al., 2005; Yamada,
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2009). This understanding represents metacognitive knowledge (Frith, 2012;
Nelson, 1996), that is, higher-order thoughts (Cleeremans, 2011;
Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012) about the JDM
processes, not knowledge that is obtained by directly accessing these
processes. In a similar fashion, people learn to evaluate the degree of certainty
when they are asked whether they perceived a near-threshold stimulus or
whether they know the right answer to a certain question (Timmermans et al.,
2012). Cleeremans (2011) suggests that consciousness in general develops
gradually when the brain learns to predict the consequences of its own actions.
In other words, consciousness results from meta-level representations that are
directed  towards  the  brain  itself.  After  one  has  developed  conscious
awareness, or a metacognitive ability to monitor these actions, they come
under voluntary control (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002; Nelson, 1996).
Other authors have also pointed out the association between consciousness
and the ability of the brain to predict how the environment responds to
different kinds of actions (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). In this framework, the
different “blindness” phenomena, such as inattentional blindness or change
blindness, are explained by their irregular, unpredictable nature (Cohen et al.,
2016): information in these cases fails to be noticed as it is not represented in
the  predictions  the  brain  has  made  about  the  surrounding  world.  Choice
blindness  (Johansson  et  al.,  2006)  suggests  that  this  applies  to  the
metacognitive awareness for the reasons of the decisions, too: due to an
extremely improbable and unpredictable event (e.g. the experimenter
performing a magic trick), the research participants are unable to gain a
metacognitive understanding that they are being cheated. Instead, they
continue as they normally would do and explain their choices as nothing was
wrong, relying on the predictions of how they would prefer things in similar
occasions.  As  metacognition  and  the  processes  that  are  the  targets  of
metacognition are dissociated (Dehaene et al., 2017), individuals are unable to
notice that their metacognitions are incorrect.
In  Study  II,  we  suggested  that  introspection  may  work  in  concert  with
attentional mechanisms. Accumulating evidence suggests that inner speech (a
verbal form of conscious thinking) facilitates attention, and that attention is
accessible to introspection (Bastian et al., 2017; Emerson & Miyake, 2003).
Although we may not control how information is integrated in automatic
processes, we may control what information is fed into those processes by
attracting our attention to different features. “We” refer, in this case, to our
conscious mental processes, the experiment instructions, schemas, narratives,
rules or similar things that we may voluntarily follow. Often these include at
least rudimentary inner speech. Requiring explanations for decisions can
evoke inner speech and thus facilitate attention to different aspects. Attended
information becomes phenomenally conscious (that is, experienced) and is
therefore available in the perceptual decision space for non-conscious
information integration processes (Morsella et al., 2016). This may further be
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amplified by the feeling of accountability, which often follows from the
requirement to justify one’s actions.
This link between voluntary attention and conscious thought reflects one
of  the  central  claims  of  this  dissertation.  Although we  are  not  often  able  to
consciously reflect the processes that integrate information and determine our
experiences, we are usually able to describe a rich subjective experience. By
shifting our voluntary attention, we can further learn the association between
information that is fed into automatic processes and the subjective experience
which results from those processes.
With high image quality estimation, the differences are small and often not
salient. Because of this, finding differences may require effortful search, that
is, the deliberate use of visual attention, which is enhanced by explaining.
These findings may apply to JDM phenomena in general. The widespread idea
of preference construction probably refers to this information search process
and not to the actual information integration processes (Glöckner & Betsch,
2008b). It appears that effective automatic information integration requires
the information to be first consciously attended (Nordgren et al., 2011) before
a  gist  representation  of  the  decision  problem  can  emerge  by  means  of  the
automatic processes (Abadie, Waroquier, et al., 2013). This gist summarizes
the  fit  of  the  alternatives,  which  can  be  used  as  a  basis  for  decision.  These
recent results are in line with the idea that the function of subjective
experience is to present a decision space which contains information that
forms the basis of voluntary actions (Morsella et al., 2016).
5.2.2 CREATION OF NARRATIVES, LEARNING AND RATIONALITY IN
JDM
In  addition  to  metacognition,  the  ability  to  explain  one’s  JDM  processes
probably  has  a  cultural,  social  and  developmental  basis  (Baumeister  &
Masicampo, 2010; Frith, 2012). It is learned by interacting with others.
Language helps to name different experiences, adopt the causal narratives
about the associations between different experiences and their consequences,
and share the experiences with other people, thus developing a pool of shared
understanding  of  what  is  good  and  bad  and  how  judgments  are  formed  in
different contexts. This is how we know that images described as “sharp” are
good  and  images  described  as  “grainy”  are  not,  without  even  looking  at  the
actual images.
In the introduction, we presented the reasoning-as-theorizing account
(Dennett,  1991;  Gazzaniga,  1989;  Nisbett  &  Wilson,  1977;  Wilson,  2002),
which states that the explanations people use for justifying their choices are
not true descriptions of their actual decision-making processes but, rather, are
causal theories about those processes to which they have no access. This
suggests that thoughts relating to JDM are epiphenomenal in character: they
have  no  role  in  determining  human  behavior.  Support  for  this  account  has
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been found in experiments where participants make rather mindless choices
and are then required to explain their actions (Johansson et al., 2006; Nisbett
& Wilson, 1977). In these cases, participants indeed fabricate their
explanations, as they have usually lost their memory traces about the
underlying experiences.
When subjective explanations are conceptualized as metacognition, the
question whether people can access their JDM processes becomes irrelevant.
The theorizing relating to the reasons for decisions can, in fact, be a part of the
learning process, where people can create metacognitive understanding about
their preferences (Frith, 2012): people have a tendency to create narratives
that describe causal and other relations between different phenomena to make
their behavior understandable to themselves and to other people (Dennett,
1991; Gazzaniga, 1989; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). These metacognitive
narratives can be modified and corrected in social interaction to better match
with  the  actual  cognitive  processes  (Frith,  2012).  When  confronted  with
similar decisions in the future, people may refer to these narratives to find a
solution and so the narratives that people create later start to control their
behaviors (Dennett, 1991; Gallagher, 2000). They can act as hypotheses for
successful or unsuccessful decisions, which guide behavior when an individual
is confronted by further choices (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Frith, 2012;
Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983). This is manifested in more consistent behaviors
across several choices. This mechanism probably enabled learning in Study IV.
By using this understanding, consciousness can detach the individual from
immediate experiences and default responses, therefore bringing consistency
to behavior in the long run. Rationality emerges from this kind of interaction
with the environment on the basis of theories and expectations (Felin et al.,
2017): humans do not have prior knowledge about how rational behavioral
occurs;  it  is  learned  from  the  social  environment  and  from  one’s  own
experiences.
Study IV thus offers a new, often neglected role for conscious thinking in
judgment and decision making: it can support learning. Generally, this aspect
of conscious thought which enhances coherency in the long run appears worth
further  research.  Ahlum-Heath  &  Di  Vesta  (1986)  have  suggested  that
verbalization creates overt commitment to the rules that individuals apply in
a task. On the other hand, mere attention to the trade-offs can enhance the
consolidation of the weights of the attributes (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010;
Hoeffler & Ariely, 1999). Berry and Broadbent (1984) showed in their dynamic
decision-making task that when research participants have been given
explanations for the right decisions in previous trials, verbalization benefitted
their  performance  more  than  just  the  silent  condition.  The  reason  was  this
effect was assumed to emerge from a synergy between explanations given to
the participants and verbalizations, as the participants tried to apply a similar
logic in their verbalizations as was present the experimenters’ explanations.
This may reflect the role of conscious thought in the application of culturally
normative reasoning in JDM. This social aspect of decision making is often
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ignored (Felin et al., 2017) and the biases and rationality literature has been
individualistic.  Hence,  the  rationality  of  the  JDM  behavior  should  also  be
studied in relation to human interaction in social, institutional and
organizational settings.
5.3 INTERFERENCE OF VERBALIZATION WITH JDM
PROCESSES
In addition to the concerns relating to access and fabrication, the
verbalization of reasons for decisions has been assumed to interfere with
primary JDM processes (Levine et al., 1996; McMackin & Slovic, 2000; Wilson
et al.,  1993; Wilson & Schooler,  1991).  This interference does not have only
negative consequences: it has been suggested that verbalization interferes with
intuitive tasks but benefits analytical tasks, and it is assumed that this occurs
because verbal processes are analytic in nature. Therefore explaining is
assumed to force the individual to shift the processing to a more analytical and
conscious mode (Baumeister et al., 2011; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hamilton et al.,
2007; Hammond et al., 1987). As a consequence, it has been quite a popular
experimental manipulation (Baumeister et al., 2011; Hamilton et al., 2007):
by asking one group of participants to explain their decisions when the other
group makes the decisions silently, makes it possible to examine the
differences between analytical and intuitive thinking. On the other hand,
explaining has also been conceptualized as a form of accountability, which
makes the individuals voluntary change the ways they process information so
they would not appear foolish in front of other people (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
So, is the change following the requirement to explain one’s decisions due
to a processing shift or to accountability? Table 2 combines these aspects. It
assumes that a match between the tasks and the processing style is moderated
by accountability. Analytical tasks that are executed using conscious thought
are based on the application of culturally shared logic, whereas intuitive tasks
are based on subjective experience. A somewhat different typology was
presented  by  Ericsson  (2003b),  who  categorized  different  types  of
verbalization in three classes, consisting of inner speech, explaining and
introspection. Inner speech should have no effect on processes. Explaining, on
the other hand, has beneficial consequences. Introspection involves additional
observation in addition to think-aloud observation.
Thinking aloud is by far the most investigated type of verbalization (Fox et
al.,  2011).  It  consists  of  verbalization  of  inner  speech,  the  verbal  content  of
conscious  thought,  without  accountability  or  the  social  pressure  to  become
understandable.  In  other  words,  participants  in  this  case  are  only  asked  to
think aloud without reflecting on or interpreting their thoughts. Much
evidence suggests that this kind of verbalization does not interfere with
primary tasks. However, it requires that the primary task should have a verbal
form and it should be solved by manipulating this information in the working
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memory (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). In other words, thinking aloud only
explicates the decisions that are based on conscious reasoning.
Table 2. Typology of verbalization as a function of accountability and the mental content
determining the decision.
Presence of accountability
Accountability No accountability
Mental
content
determining
the decision
Subjective
experience
Justification Description of
experience
Conscious
thought
Explaining Thinking aloud
Description  of  an  experience  is  the  counterpart  to  thinking  aloud  in  the
context of phenomenal consciousness, in a sense that is lacks the
accountability and the pressure of being understandable. In other words, it
lacks the explicit logic of conscious thought. It consists of verbalization of
subjective experience and it should exclude any interpretative content
(Petitmengin & Bitbol, 2009). So far, this type of verbalization is understudied.
It has been suggested that performing the description of experience should be
beneficial or at least neutral when conducted properly (Petitmengin et al.,
2013). This means that participants are instructed to focus on experiences and
not  on  their  thoughts,  which  may  require  practice.  As  the  two  types  of
verbalization do not cause the processing shift from a more intuitive and
experiential mode towards a more analytical and conscious mode, it appears
that the processing shift requires accountability.
When participants explain their actions, they try to make their actions
understandable. This aspect differentiates explaining from previous types of
verbalizations which lack this kind of accountability. Explanations are
expected to be dependent on a socially shared logic of how decisions should
generally be made. If an individual has a disposition towards a more intuitive
solution,  this  is  commonly  assumed  to  shift  processing  towards  a  more
explicit, or conscious and verbal mode, which can explicate this can kind of
shared verbal logic. Whether this shift benefits or distracts the individuals’
performance is dependent on their metacognitive understanding about the
JDM processes in the task in question (Dijkstra et al., 2013). If the task
generally benefits from a logical approach, explaining has been shown to
enhance performance (Fox et al., 2011). This, of course, requires that the
individual  in  question  has  some  kind  of  idea  of  the  rules  that  should  be
followed. Personal preferences can often ignore socially shared logic and can
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therefore  be  difficult  to  explain,  which  may  lead  individuals  to  temporarily
change their preferences. The results presented in this dissertation suggest
that explaining can also benefit certain JDM tasks that are based on subjective
experiences. These tasks might, for example, require more effortful
information  search.  This  may  deepen  the  experience  and  lead  to  a  wider
decision space.
When decisions that are based on subjective experience are explained to
others, the process is here called justification. If one would normally approach
a certain JDM problem intuitively, basing it on a certain subjective feeling, the
requirement to provide reasons for that decision can lead to two alternative
consequences. The first is that the individual changes the mode of processing
towards a more conscious mode and explains how a  certain  conclusion  has
been reached. The second alternative is that the individual still makes the
decision intuitively and justifies it. Justification therefore differs from
explaining in the sense that it is made post hoc; it is created afterwards, while
explaining occurs on-line, even if it is reported after the decision. Hence
justification lacks the interaction between thoughts and subjective experience.
In its strictest sense, justification is therefore a form of fabrication. From the
viewpoint that is adopted in this dissertation, justifications represent the
personal metacognitive understanding about the JDM process. Whether these
metacognitions are correct depends on the learning history and the typicality
of the task. From the description of the experience, which basically describes
the decision space, justification differs by being a causal narrative which
interprets how the decision was made on the basis of that decision space.
5.4 SHIFTING VIEWS ON INTROSPECTION?
Although cognitive psychology does not rely on behavioristic stimulus-
response (S-R) connections in its theoretical conceptualizations, this approach
is still prevalent in its methodology (Costall, 2006). In many respects, this also
applies  to  research  on  JDM:  participants  in  experiments  are  given  some
information about alternatives and their corresponding attributes (stimulus)
and they are asked to make a choice between alternatives (response). The
process-tracing tradition, of course, exists, but it does not differ from more
behavioristic approaches in its concern with objectivity (e.g. Ericsson & Simon,
1980; Fox C. et al., 2011) and therefore subjective descriptions of the reasons
for decisions have been treated with suspicion. Moreover, subjective
experience has often been viewed as a source of biases – as the heuristics and
biases research program suggests (Kahneman, 2003) – rather than a relevant
intermediate  stage  of  processing.  It  is  somewhat  ironic  that  subjective
experience, in fact, has a major role in psychological research as responses, but
not as mediators (Costall, 2006). Psychophysics and personality and social
psychology, for instance, often rely on self-reports. Despite this interest in
subjective  experience  as  a  response  to  stimuli,  the  attitudes  towards  the
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mediating role of subjective experience have been skeptical (D. A. Lieberman,
1979).
The behaviorist S-R approach is actually a false simplification of the
experimental procedure in psychological experiments, because the response
always follows the script that is given to the participants by the experimenter:
the instructions tell participants how they should interpret the stimuli and
how they should act on them (Jack & Roepstorff, 2002). Despite the common
instructions given to the participants prior to the experiment, the
interpretations about the experimental task can differ. If one is asked to
estimate quality, the personal definition of quality or personal taste can differ,
causing “errors” in the data. In all experiments presented here, participants
were asked to make multidimensional judgments. The task requires
participants to figure out the differences between alternatives; determine the
valence, that is, the goodness or badness of these differences and determine
the weight or the importance of each difference. In other words, there are
countless ways the participants could interpret the task, stated simply as
“which one of the images do you prefer?” Without knowing the interpretation,
we do not know the script that participants are actually following and causing
differences in the participants’ behavior. Study III is an example of this
approach: we could explain both better and worse task performance on the
basis of the verbal data provided by the participants. This made it possible to
understand the contradictory effects of explaining in different studies.
Without this participant-centric approach, we may have only made
conclusions on the basis of mean performance.
When the behavioral response is a counterpart of the stimulus, Jack and
Roepstorff (2002) regard verbal reports as a counterpart of the script. Verbal
reports can make the differences between different interpretations explicit,
making the behavior of the participants understandable. In some cases, the
research participants’ peculiar responses may become understandable when
their interpretation of the task is explicated (Leisti et al., 2008). Our present
studies, on the other hand, suggest that participants do not make choices
analytically on the basis of the objective attributes of the alternatives, nor do
they make them non-consciously; rather they are making decisions quasi-
analytically on the basis of a few subjective and experiential dimensions that
appear relevant to the task and become represented in awareness. Hence,
knowing these dimensions is crucial for understanding people’s preferences.
The theme of this dissertation emphasizes the role of the interaction between
conscious thought and subjective experience, therefore opposing the recent
trend which stresses non-conscious processes (Baumeister et al 2017,
Williams & Poehlman, 2017; Plassman & Mormann, 2017).
Additionally, the scientific publication process can sometimes bias the way
certain phenomena are viewed. Self-reflection and deliberation are usually
considered beneficial behaviors; that they should be a disadvantage appears
counter-intuitive and naturally interests both researchers and lay people. This
may result in a larger number of citations and thus a larger impact. In the
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eighties, scientific articles concerning bad decision making were found to
attract many more citations than articles about good decision making, and this
was found to have a significant effect on psychologists’ attitudes towards
people’s ability to make good decisions (Christensen-Szalanski & Beach,
1984).  A vast  amount of  research where humans are shown to perform well
have had little attention paid to them (Felin et al., 2017).
Psychological experimentation often exploits a strategy of designing
experiments by using somewhat peculiar and unusual tasks, so that
participants can be induced into doing something counter-intuitive or even
irrational (Simonson, 2008). This is often important as it can cast light on the
underlying processes when people do not behave according to the predictions
of normative economic theories. Unfortunately, these results are often
generalized without taking into account the original, unusual condition in
which the original task was carried out. For example, participants in
Experiment  2  of  Wilson’s  and  Schooler’s  (1991)  study  were  asked  to
“introspect” their decisions by using rating scales. It appears that this form of
involuntary mode of reflection interfered with their own way of evaluating the
alternatives  by  focusing  their  attention  on  the  aspects  given  by  the
experimenter (Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999). Wilson & Schooler (1991) actually
suggested that their findings should not be generalized everywhere;
introspection can sometimes be detrimental but their results do not imply that
this is always the case. In spite of this, their results have been seen as evidence
that any method that relies on subjective explanations for actions is invalid.
Nevertheless, discussion about the ability to introspect subjective
experiences  is  gradually  shifting  from  a  categorical  yes-no  dispute  to  the
examination of conditions that facilitate or hinder successful introspection.
Wilson (Hofmann & Wilson, 2010) and Schooler (Schooler & Schreiber,
2004), who had initially warned about the interfering effect of introspection
on JDM, preferences and attitudes, now emphasize that reliable introspection
is possible when an individual has the ability to concentrate on a subjective
experience. Other authors have presented similar ideas (Locke, 2009). This
ability appears to be related to, for example, the ability to concentrate on
present experience, which also has other beneficial effects (Tang et al., 2015).
The changing views may reflect the fact that consciousness has gradually
become a respectable area of scientific study after decades of methodological
behaviorism.
The results of this research suggest that the claims that have emphasized
the fallibility of introspective self-reports and the maladaptive effect of self-
reflection may have attracted too much weight in the literature. However, as
recent research appears to undermine the role of conscious thought, it would
seem that there is a need for understanding the role of subjective experience
in human behavior. Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) call for a systematic
research program on the phenomenological side of intuition, focusing on how
intuition presents itself to us. The IBQ approach could give some insights on
that issue, too.
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation started by describing the social importance of the ability to
explain one’s judgments and decisions to other people. This perspective has
been quite prevalent in basic research, emphasizing the role of conscious
thought both in the JDM processes and the social nature of the explanations.
Another important theme emphasized the unique, subjective point of view,
which is manifested in subjective experience, which forms a basis for personal
judgments  and  decisions.  The  latter  theme  has  been  prevalent  in  the
development of the IBQ method and other similar approaches that are based
on  examining  aspects  of  subjective  experience.  The  purpose  of  this
dissertation was to integrate these views, as academic psychology tends to be
highly skeptical towards this kind of subjective data, whereas its use within the
applied sciences appears to lack this prejudice.
Contrary to common claims from psychological basic research, explaining
was found to benefit the visual judgment and decision making tasks employed
in this dissertation. Nor was the claim that explanations are fabrications
supported by our research: those who were able to create more predictable
explanations were also more coherent in their choices. We also found that
explaining allowed participants to weight the information more consistently.
From the practical point of view, when methods that rely on participants’
verbal description of their experiences are used, it should somehow be
ascertained that participants focus properly on their experiences instead of
applying a stock theory of how their judgment should have been formed.
Both reliance on conscious thinking and reliance on subjective experience
have been seen as sources of irrationality. The results of the experiments
presented in this dissertation emphasize rationality in context. Benefits of
conscious thought materialize in interaction with social and developmental
contexts (Baumeister & Masicampo, 2010; Felin et al., 2017; Mercier &
Sperber, 2011). Subjective experience, on the other hand, leads to rationality
when it is combined with expertise.
Finally, the society around the academic environment usually requires
knowledge about subjective experience. The qualitative approaches in food
sciences, for example, suggest a strong interest in subjective experience. In
addition, social sciences increasingly emphasize experiential data. That
people’s experiences are respected is a generally positive social change and
therefore there is a growing applied need for understanding subjective
experiences and how they relate to thinking and objective facts. Condemning
subjective experience as an unreliable source of information makes little sense
when there is a growing requirement for understanding personal experiences.
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